CVE Feed

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate free block extents against the partition length udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap array. A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the image have a higher prerequisite. No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by a kernel panic. Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted callers cannot walk past the flexible array.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size: map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2; lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads ((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block] so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read. Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: fsl-lpspi: terminate the RX channel on TX prepare failure path When dmaengine_prep_slave_sg() fails for the TX channel, the error path terminates the TX DMA channel but leaves the RX channel running. Since the RX channel was already submitted and issued prior to preparing the TX descriptor, returning -EINVAL causes the SPI core to unmap the DMA buffers while the RX DMA engine continues writing to them, leading to potential memory corruption or use-after-free. Terminate the RX channel before returning on the TX prepare failure path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - validate RSA CRT component lengths The generic RSA key parser (rsa_helper.c) bounds each CRT component (p, q, dp, dq, qinv) by the modulus size n_sz, but qat_rsa_setkey_crt() allocates half-size DMA buffers (key_sz / 2) and right-aligns each component with: memcpy(dst + half_key_sz - len, src, len) When a CRT component is larger than half_key_sz the subtraction underflows and memcpy writes past the DMA buffer, causing memory corruption. Add a len > half_key_sz check next to the existing !len check for each of the five CRT components so the driver falls back to the non-CRT path instead of writing out of bounds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len, each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory trips the soft-lockup watchdog. A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel. Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Pin source page for write when adding CPUID data for SNP guest When populating a guest_memfd instance with the initial CPUID data for an SNP guest, acquire a writable pin on the source page as KVM will write back the "correct" CPUID information if the userspace provided data is rejected by trusted firmware. Because KVM writes to the source page using a kernel mapping, pinning for read could result in KVM clobbering read-only memory. Note, well-behaved VMMs are unlikely to be affected, as CPUID information is almost always dynamically generated by userspace, i.e. it's unlikely for the CPUID information to be backed by a read-only mapping. [sean: rewrite shortlog and changelog, tag for stable@]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: serial: samsung: Remove redundant port lock acquisition in rx helpers Sashiko identified a deadlock when the console flow is engaged [1]. When console flow control is enabled (UPF_CONS_FLOW), s3c24xx_serial_stop_tx() calls s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable() and s3c24xx_serial_start_tx() calls s3c24xx_serial_rx_disable(). The serial core framework invokes the .stop_tx() and .start_tx() callbacks with the port->lock spinlock already held. Furthermore, all internal driver paths that invoke stop_tx (such as the DMA TX completion handler s3c24xx_serial_tx_dma_complete() or the PIO TX IRQ handler s3c24xx_serial_tx_irq()) also acquire port->lock prior to calling it. (Note that s3c24xx_serial_start_tx() is only invoked by the serial core). However, s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable() and s3c24xx_serial_rx_disable() unconditionally attempt to acquire port->lock again using uart_port_lock_irqsave(). Since spinlocks are not recursive, this causes a deadlock on the same CPU when console flow control is engaged. Remove the redundant lock acquisition from both rx helper functions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: buffer: hw-consumer: free scan_mask on buffer release The scan_mask lifetime changed in commit 9a2e1233d38c ("iio: buffer: hw-consumer: remove redundant scan_mask flexible array"). Before that change, the scan mask storage was embedded in struct hw_consumer_buffer, so iio_hw_buf_release() could free the whole allocation with a single kfree(hw_buf). That commit moved the scan mask to a separate bitmap_zalloc() allocation stored in buffer.scan_mask, but left iio_hw_buf_release() unchanged. Free the scan mask in iio_hw_buf_release() before freeing the buffer wrapper.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aoa: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. In layout.c, the function does not check the return value before dereferencing ctl->id.name or passing to aoa_snd_ctl_add(), which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return early if any fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: fix out-of-bounds read in the Traktor Kontrol S4 input parser snd_usb_caiaq_tks4_dispatch() decodes the Traktor Kontrol S4 input stream in fixed 16-byte (TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE) message blocks. On every iteration it advances buf and subtracts the block size while looping on "while (len)". len is urb->actual_length. That value is supplied by the device and is not guaranteed to be a multiple of 16. When a final short block leaves len between 1 and 15, the loop runs once more, reads up to buf[15], and then does "len -= TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE". As len is unsigned this underflows to a huge value. The loop then keeps iterating and walking buf far past the end of the 512-byte ep4_in_buf, reading out of bounds until a bogus block id happens to be hit. Iterate only while a full message block is available. This stops the unsigned underflow and silently drops any trailing partial block, which carries no complete control value anyway. The sibling endpoint-4 parsers are not affected. The Traktor Kontrol X1 and Maschine arms in snd_usb_caiaq_ep4_reply_dispatch() floor urb->actual_length before dispatching.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: firewire: isight: bound the sample count to the packet payload isight_packet() takes the frame count from the device iso packet and checks it only against the device claimed iso length. count = be32_to_cpu(payload->sample_count); if (likely(count <= (length - 16) / 4)) isight_samples(isight, payload->samples, count); length is the iso header data_length. It can be up to 0xffff. So the gate allows a count up to about 16379. isight_samples() then copies count frames out of payload->samples into the PCM DMA buffer. payload->samples holds only 2 * MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET values. The device multiplexes two samples per frame. A count past MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET reads past the payload. A count past the buffer size writes past runtime->dma_area. The smallest PCM buffer is larger than MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET. Bounding the count to MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET keeps both the read and the write in range. A malicious or faulty Apple iSight on the FireWire bus reaches this during a normal capture. Add the MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET bound to the gate.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release() When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack to clear the t->from and t->to_proc that correspond with the exiting thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t->to_proc, the t->to_proc->inner_lock will not be acquired. This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after t->to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction() and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715 CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c [...] Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s: __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150 binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354 binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c [...] Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294 binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8 binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads the t->to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus, it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpci_rt1711h: unregister TCPCI port with devres rt1711h_probe() registers the TCPCI port before requesting the interrupt and enabling alert interrupts. If either of those later steps fails, the probe function returns without unregistering the TCPCI port. The explicit unregister currently only happens from the remove callback. Register a devres action immediately after tcpci_register_port() succeeds, so tcpci_unregister_port() runs on later probe failures and on driver detach. Drop the remove callback to avoid unregistering the same port twice. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: Fix next buffer leak in receive_encrypted_standard() receive_encrypted_standard() allocates next_buffer before checking whether the number of compound PDUs already reached MAX_COMPOUND. If the limit check fails, the function returns immediately and the newly allocated next_buffer is not assigned to server->smallbuf/server->bigbuf, making it leaked. Move the MAX_COMPOUND check before allocating next_buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: use a u64 stride when cleaning up the offsets array Allocation's Drop walks the offsets array (binder_size_t = u64 entries), cleaning up the objects, but it used usize instead of u64 for both the stride and the per-entry read. On 64-bit kernels (usize == u64) this is harmless, but on 32-bit kernels it walks the 8-byte entries in 4-byte steps, iterating an N-entry array 2N times, and reads the always-zero high word as offset 0, cleaning up the object at offset 0 N extra times. As a result the referenced node or handle ends up with a lower reference count than it actually has (a refcount over-decrement), and binder's reference accounting is corrupted; for example, the owner can be notified of a strong reference release (BR_RELEASE) even though references still remain. Change the stride to u64, and read each entry as a u64, narrowing it to usize with try_into(). On 32-bit ARM, when this over-decrement would drive a count below zero, the driver's existing refcount guard refuses it and fires: rust_binder: Failure: refcount underflow!

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_pci: fix vq info pointer lookup via wrong index Unbinding a virtio balloon device: echo virtio0 > /sys/bus/virtio/drivers/virtio_balloon/unbind triggers a NULL pointer dereference. The dmesg says: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [...] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x5/0xf0 Call Trace: <TASK> vp_del_vqs+0x121/0x230 remove_common+0x135/0x150 virtballoon_remove+0xee/0x100 virtio_dev_remove+0x3b/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x187/0x2c0 unbind_store+0xb9/0xe0 kernfs_fop_write_iter.llvm.11660790530567441834+0xf6/0x180 vfs_write+0x2a9/0x3b0 ksys_write+0x5c/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x29/0x31 [...] </TASK> The virtio_balloon device registers 5 queues (inflate, deflate, stats, free_page, reporting) but only the first two are unconditional. The stats, free_page and reporting queues are each conditional on their respective feature bits. When any of these features are absent, the corresponding vqs_info entry has name == NULL, creating holes in the array. The root cause is an indexing mismatch introduced when vq info storage was changed to be passed as an argument. vp_find_vqs_msix() and vp_find_vqs_intx() store the info pointer at vp_dev->vqs[i], where 'i' is the caller's sparse array index. However, the virtqueue itself gets vq->index assigned from queue_idx, a dense index that skips NULL entries. When holes exist, 'i' and queue_idx diverge. Later, vp_del_vqs() looks up info via vp_dev->vqs[vq->index] using the dense index into the sparsely-populated array, and hits NULL. Fix this by storing info at vp_dev->vqs[queue_idx] instead of vp_dev->vqs[i], so the store index matches the lookup index (vq->index). Apply the fix to both the MSIX and INTX paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent path traversal bypass by restricting caseless retry ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() enforces LOOKUP_BENEATH to restrict path resolution within the share root. When a crafted path attempts to escape the share boundary using parent-directory components ('..'), vfs_path_parent_lookup() detects this and immediately fails, returning -EXDEV. However, a bug exists in __ksmbd_vfs_kern_path() under caseless mode. The function fails to intercept the -EXDEV error and erroneously falls through to the caseless retry logic, which is intended only for genuinely missing files. During this retry process, the path is reconstructed, leading to an unintended LOOKUP_BENEATH bypass that allows write-capable users to create zero-length files or directories outside the exported share. Fix this by ensuring that the execution only proceeds to the caseless lookup retry when the error is specifically -ENOENT. Any other errors, such as -EXDEV from a path traversal attempt, must be returned immediately.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: writeback: fix race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs() When a container exits, the following BUG_ON() is occasionally triggered: ================================================================== VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of sdb (ext4) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:695! CPU: 3 PID: 6 Comm: containerd-shim Tainted: G OE K 6.6 #1 pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 lr : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 Call trace: generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 kill_block_super+0x20/0x48 ext4_kill_sb+0x28/0x60 deactivate_locked_super+0x54/0x130 deactivate_super+0x84/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0xa4/0x140 __cleanup_mnt+0x18/0x28 task_work_run+0x78/0xe0 do_notify_resume+0x204/0x240 ================================================================== The root cause is a race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs()/cleanup_offline_cgwb(). There is a window between inode_prepare_wbs_switch() returning true and the subsequent wb_queue_isw() call. Following is the process that triggers the issue: CPU A (umount) | CPU B (writeback) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ inode_switch_wbs/cleanup_offline_cgwb atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight) inode_prepare_wbs_switch -> passes SB_ACTIVE check __iget(inode) generic_shutdown_super sb->s_flags &= ~SB_ACTIVE cgroup_writeback_umount(sb) smp_mb() atomic_read(&isw_nr_in_flight) rcu_barrier() -> no pending RCU callbacks flush_workqueue(isw_wq) -> nothing queued, returns evict_inodes(sb) -> Inode skipped as isw still holds a ref. sop->put_super(sb) /* destroys percpu counters */ -> VFS: Busy inodes after unmount! wb_queue_isw() queue_work(isw_wq, ...) /* later in work function */ inode_switch_wbs_work_fn process_inode_switch_wbs iput() -> evict percpu_counter_dec() // UAF! Fix this by extending the RCU read-side critical section in inode_switch_wbs() and cleanup_offline_cgwb() to cover from inode_prepare_wbs_switch() through wb_queue_isw(). Since there is no sleep in this window, rcu_read_lock() can be used. Then add a synchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount() before the existing rcu_barrier(), so that all in-flight switchers that have passed the SB_ACTIVE check have completed queue_work() before flush_workqueue() is called. The existing rcu_barrier() is intentionally retained so this fix can be backported unchanged to stable kernels (5.10.y, 6.6.y, ...) that still queue switches via queue_rcu_work(). It is a no-op on current mainline (since commit e1b849cfa6b6 ("writeback: Avoid contention on wb->list_lock when switching inodes")) and is removed in a follow-up patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD) Sashiko notes: > if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a > userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., > SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN > execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the > host? The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note: > On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted. That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do anything if SNP has not been previously initialized. This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Set veventq_depth upper bound iommufd_veventq_alloc() accepts any !0 veventq_depth from userspace, with an upper bound at U32_MAX. This leaves a vulnerability where userspace can allocate excessively large queues to exhaust kernel memory reserves. Cap the veventq_depth (maximum number of entries) to 1 << 19, matching the maximum number of entries in the SMMUv3 EVTQ (the largest use case today).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: tsconfig: fix missing ethnl_ops_complete() tsconfig_prepare_data() calls ethnl_ops_begin(), we need to call ethnl_ops_complete() before returning the error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: userfaultfd: gate must_wait writability check on pte_present() userfaultfd_must_wait() and userfaultfd_huge_must_wait() read the PTE without taking the page table lock and then apply pte_write() / huge_pte_write() to it. Those accessors decode bits from the present encoding only; on a swap or migration entry they read the offset bits that happen to share the same position and return an undefined result. The intent of the check is "is this fault still WP-blocked?". A non-marker swap entry means the page is in transit -- the userfault context the original fault delivered against is no longer the same, and the swap-in or migration completion path will re-deliver a fresh fault if userspace still needs to handle it. Worst case under the current code the garbage write bit says "wait", and the thread stays asleep until a UFFDIO_WAKE that may never arrive. Gate the writability check on pte_present() so the lockless re-check only inspects present-PTE bits when the entry is actually present. The non-present, non-marker case returns "don't wait" and lets the fault path retry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: ice1712: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. The ice1712 driver calls snd_ctl_new1() without checking the return value before dereferencing the pointer in multiple places (ice1712.c, ice1724.c, aureon.c), which can lead to NULL pointer dereferences. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: ti-ads1119: fix PM reference leak in buffer preenable ads1119_triggered_buffer_preenable() resumes the device with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() before starting a conversion. If i2c_smbus_write_byte() fails, the function returns the error directly and leaves the runtime PM usage counter elevated. The matching postdisable callback is not called when preenable fails, so the reference is leaked and the device may remain runtime-active indefinitely. Store the I2C transfer result in ret and drop the runtime PM reference on failure before returning the error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: sideband: fix ring sg table pages leak xhci_ring_to_sgtable() allocates a temporary pages array and uses it to build the returned sg_table with sg_alloc_table_from_pages(). The error paths free the pages array, but the success path returns the sg_table without freeing it. This leaks the temporary array every time a sideband client gets an endpoint or event ring buffer. Free the pages array after sg_alloc_table_from_pages() succeeds. The returned sg_table has its own scatterlist entries and does not depend on the temporary array after construction.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix use-after-free on remove KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link() during rmmod of imx8_isi: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650 Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000d47cb02a by task rmmod/724 Call trace: __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650 __media_entity_remove_links+0x78/0x144 __media_device_unregister_entity+0x150/0x280 media_device_unregister_entity+0x48/0x68 v4l2_device_unregister_subdev+0x158/0x300 v4l2_async_unbind_subdev_one+0x22c/0x358 v4l2_async_nf_unbind_all_subdevs+0xfc/0x1c0 v4l2_async_nf_unregister+0x5c/0x14c mxc_isi_remove+0x124/0x2a0 [imx8_isi] Allocated by task 249: __kmalloc_noprof+0x27c/0x690 mxc_isi_crossbar_init+0x22c/0x560 [imx8_isi] Freed by task 724: kfree+0x1e4/0x5b0 mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup+0x34/0x80 [imx8_isi] mxc_isi_remove+0x11c/0x2a0 [imx8_isi] The problem is that mxc_isi_remove() calls mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() before mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup(). The crossbar cleanup frees the media entity pads, but the subsequent v4l2 cleanup still tries to remove media links that reference those pads. Fix this by calling mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup() before mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() to ensure all media entities are properly unregistered while the pads are still valid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown cs35l41_hda creates ALSA controls whose private data points at the cs35l41_hda object. The firmware load control can also queue fw_load_work. Those controls are not removed on component unbind, and device remove only cancels fw_load_work through cs35l41_remove_dsp(). That helper is skipped when halo_initialized is false. With firmware_autostart disabled, a firmware load can be requested before the DSP has been initialized. If the component or device is removed before the queued work runs, the worker can run after teardown and dereference driver state that is no longer valid. Track the created controls and remove them on unbind so no new control callback can reach the driver data or queue more work. Then cancel fw_load_work to drain any request that was already queued. Also cancel the work unconditionally during device remove before runtime PM teardown.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on marvell probe failure Make sure to stop any TX URBs submitted during Marvell OOB wakeup configuration on later probe failures to avoid use-after-free in the completion callback. This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup source leak in the btusb probe errors paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item commit 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop") fixed the obvious case where io_worker_handle_work() took one exit-bit snapshot before draining pending work, but the fix stops one level too early. io_worker_handle_work() now re-checks IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT in its outer work run loop, yet it still snapshots that bit once before processing a whole dependent linked-work chain. If io_wq_exit_start() sets IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT after the first linked item has started, the remaining linked items can still reuse stale do_kill = false, skip IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, and continue running after exit has begun. Move the check further inside, so it covers linked items too. Note: this is a syzbot special as it loves setting up tons of slow linked work on weird devices like msr that take forever to read, and immediately close the ring. Exit then takes a long time.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release() The chaoskey driver has a use-after-free bug in its release routine. If the user closes the device file after the USB device has been unplugged, a debugging log statement will try to access the usb_interface structure after it has been deallocated: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888168e8a0b8 by task chaoskey_raw_re/10106 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406) __dynamic_dev_dbg (lib/dynamic_debug.c:906) chaoskey_release (drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:323) __fput (fs/file_table.c:510) fput_close_sync (fs/file_table.c:615) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1507 fs/open.c:1492 fs/open.c:1492) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) The driver's last reference to the interface structure is dropped in the chaoskey_free() routine, so the code must not use the interface -- even in a debugging statement -- after that routine returns. (Exception: If we know that another reference is held by someone else, such as the device core while the disconnect routine runs, there's no problem. Thanks to Johan Hovold for pointing this out.) Since the bad access is part of an unimportant debugging statement, we can fix the problem simply by removing the whole statement.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(), mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by BITS_PER_LONG. As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts() runs for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++) clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags); with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received). The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID multitouch device; no local privileges are required. Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots, and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two "mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts). Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned long on 32-bit.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: ulpi: fix memory leak on registration failure The allocated device name is never freed on early ULPI device registration failures. Fix this by initialising the device structure earlier and releasing the initial reference whenever registration fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust: block: fix GenDisk cleanup paths GenDiskBuilder::build() still has fallible work after __blk_mq_alloc_disk(), but its error path only recovers the foreign queue data. That leaks the temporary gendisk and request_queue until later teardown. If the caller moved the last Arc<TagSet<T>> into build(), the leaked queue can retain blk-mq state after the tag set is dropped. Fix the pre-registration failure path by dropping the temporary gendisk reference with put_disk() before recovering queue_data, so disk_release() can tear down the owned queue. Also pair GenDisk::drop() with put_disk() after del_gendisk(). Once a Rust GenDisk has been added with device_add_disk(), del_gendisk() only unregisters it; the final gendisk reference still has to be dropped to complete the release path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86,fs/resctrl: Prevent out-of-bounds access while offlining CPU when SNC enabled The architecture updates the cpu_mask in a domain's header to track which online CPUs are associated with the domain. When this mask becomes empty the architecture initiates offline of the domain that includes calling on resctrl fs to offline the domain. If it is a monitoring domain in which LLC occupancy is tracked resctrl fs forces the limbo handler to clear all busy RMID state associated with the domain. The limbo handler always reads the current event value associated with a busy RMID irrespective of it being checked as part of regular "is it still busy" check or whether it will be forced released anyway. When reading an RMID on a system with SNC enabled the "logical RMID" is converted to the "physical RMID" and this conversion requires the NUMA node ID of the resctrl monitoring domain that is in turn determined by querying the NUMA node ID of any CPU belonging to the monitoring domain. When the monitoring domain is going offline its cpu_mask is empty causing the NUMA node ID query via cpu_to_node() to be done with "nr_cpu_ids" as argument resulting in an out-of-bounds access. Refactor the limbo handler to skip reading the RMID when the RMID will just be forced to no longer be dirty in the domain anyway. Add a safety check to the architecture's RMID reader to protect against this scenario.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netpoll: fix a use-after-free on shutdown path There is a use-after-free error on netpoll, which is clearly detected by KASAN. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3b/0x80 Read of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/9:1 Workqueue: events queue_process Call Trace: skb_dequeue+0x1e/0xb0 queue_process+0x2c/0x600 process_scheduled_works+0x4b6/0x850 worker_thread+0x414/0x5a0 Allocated by task 242: __netpoll_setup+0x201/0x4a0 netpoll_setup+0x249/0x550 enabled_store+0x32f/0x380 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1b7/0x540 rcu_core+0x3f8/0x7a0 The problem happens when there is a pending TX worker running in parallel with the cleanup path. This is what happens on netpoll shutdown path: 1) __netpoll_cleanup() is called 2) set dev->npinfo to NULL 3) call_rcu() with rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() 3.1) rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() tries to cancel all workers with cancel_delayed_work(), but doesn't wait for the worker to finish 4) and kfree(npinfo); Because 3.1) doesn't really cancel the work, as the comment says "we can't call cancel_delayed_work_sync here, as we are in softirq", the TX worker can run after 4). Tl;DR: queue_process() is not an RCU reader, it reaches npinfo through the work item via container_of(). Use disable_delayed_work_sync() to ensure the worker is completely stopped and prevent any future re-arming attempts. Once npinfo is set to NULL, senders will bail out and not queue new work. The disable flag ensures any in-flight re-arming attempts also fail silently. In the future, we can do the cleanup inline here without needing the npinfo->rcu rcu_head, but that is net-next material.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt->len) bytes out of the bulk IN buffer (usbio->rxbuf, allocated with size usbio->rxbuf_len) into the caller's buffer. bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked against usbio->txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len: if ((obuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) || (ibuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt)))) return -EMSGSIZE; txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe(). A malicious or malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len. memcpy() then reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab object. The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read. The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len. Reject any response that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing "act < sizeof(*bpkt)" check just above. The control path (usbio_ctrl_msg()) is not affected: it uses a single buffer (ctrlbuf) for both directions, so its analogous copy can never leave the allocation. Found by code review. The out-of-bounds read was confirmed under AddressSanitizer with a faithful userspace model of usbio_bulk_msg()'s receive path (an rxbuf_len-sized buffer, the same act/ibuf_len/bpkt_len checks and the memcpy). A USB raw-gadget + dummy_hcd reproducer is also available.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: page_ext: add count limit to page_ext_iter_next to prevent invalid PFN access The page_ext iteration API does not validate if the PFN still belongs to a valid section while advancing the iterator. When dynamically adding memory in the hotplug path, it can lead to a NULL pointer dereference during page_ext_lookup at the boundary of the last valid section when iterator count equals __pgcount. The for_each_page_ext() macro calls page_ext_iter_next() as its loop increment. for_each_page_ext() does a "__page_ext = page_ext_iter_next(&__iter)" at the end. This causes page_ext_iter_next() to increment iter->index past __pgcount and call page_ext_lookup(start_pfn + __pgcount). During memory hotplug (online), the PFN at start_pfn + __pgcount may belong to a section that has not yet been initialized, causing page_ext_lookup() to trigger a NULL pointer dereference. [ 14.555124][ T846] Call trace: [ 14.555125][ T846] lookup_page_ext+0x6c/0x108 (P) [ 14.555127][ T846] page_ext_lookup+0x30/0x3c [ 14.555129][ T846] __reset_page_owner+0x11c/0x260 [ 14.571201][ T846] __free_pages_ok+0x5e8/0x8e0 [ 14.571204][ T846] __free_pages_core+0x78/0xf0 [ 14.571206][ T846] generic_online_page+0x14/0x24 [ 14.597782][ T846] online_pages+0x178/0x30c [ 14.597784][ T846] memory_block_change_state+0x284/0x32c [ 14.597787][ T846] memory_subsys_online+0x4c/0x64 [ 14.597789][ T846] device_online+0x88/0xb0 [ 14.597791][ T846] online_memory_block+0x30/0x40 [ 14.597793][ T846] walk_memory_blocks+0xac/0xe8 [ 14.597794][ T846] add_memory_resource+0x280/0x298 [ 14.656161][ T846] add_memory+0x60/0x98 Move the iteration boundary enforcement inside the iterator functions, so callers cannot inadvertently access beyond the requested range.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw89: correct drop logic for malformed AMPDU frames The previous commit aims to fix issue caused by malformed AMPDU frames. But the drop logic fails to deal with the first AMPDU packet paired with certain range of sequence number, and leads to unexpected packet drop. It is more likely to encounter this failure when there are busy traffic during rekey process and could lead to disconnection from the AP. Fix this by adding a initial state judgement and only reset status during pairwise rekey.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Latch disable_idle_d3 per device When disable_idle_d3 was introduced in vfio-pci, it directly manipulated the device power state with pci_set_power_state(). There were no refcounts to maintain or balanced operations, we could unconditionally bring the device to D0 and conditionally move it to D3hot. Therefore the module parameter was made writable. Later, in commit c61302aa48f7 ("vfio/pci: Move module parameters to vfio_pci.c"), as part of the vfio-pci-core split, the writable aspect of the module parameter was nullified. The parameter value could still be changed through sysfs, but the vfio-pci driver latched the values into vfio-pci-core globals at module init. Loading the vfio-pci module, or unloading and reloading, with non-default or different values could change the globals relative to existing devices bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. Runtime PM was introduced in commit 7ab5e10eda02 ("vfio/pci: Move the unused device into low power state with runtime PM"), which marks the point where power states became refcounted. PM get and put operations need to be balanced, but the same module operations noted above can change the global variables relative to those devices already bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. This introduces a window where PM operations can now become unbalanced. To resolve this with a narrow footprint for stable backports, the disable_idle_d3 flag is latched into the vfio_pci_core_device at the time of initialization, such that the device always operates with a consistent value. NB. vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset() now unconditionally raises the runtime PM usage count around bus reset to account for disable_idle_d3 becoming a per-device rather than global flag. When this flag is set, the additional get/put pair is harmless and allows continued use of the shared vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get() helper.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: clear freeze listener on node removal Generally userspace is supposed to explicitly clear freeze listeners before they drop the refcount on the node ref to zero, but there's nothing forcing that. Currently, in this scenario the freeze listener remains in the freeze_listeners rbtree and in the remote node's freeze listener list, even though the ref for which the listener is registered is gone. This could potentially lead to a memory leak due to a refcount cycle. Thus, remove the freeze listener in this scenario.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: cros_ec: Delay dev_set_drvdata() until probe success If ec_device_probe() fails, cros_ec_class_release releases memory for the cros_ec_dev structure. However, because the drvdata was already set, sub-drivers like cros_ec_typec can still retrieve the stale pointer via the platform device. This leads to a use-after-free when cros_ec_typec attempts to access &typec->ec->ec->dev on a device that has already been released. Move dev_set_drvdata() to ensure that the pointer is only made available once all initialization steps have succeeded. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/class/chromeos/cros_ec' Call trace: sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x94/0xdc sysfs_create_link+0x30/0x44 device_add_class_symlinks+0x90/0x13c device_add+0xf0/0x50c ec_device_probe+0x150/0x4f0 platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 ... BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in __memcpy+0x44/0x230 Write at addr f5ffff809e2d33ac by task kworker/u32:5/125 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [fe] Tainted : [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google Navi unprovisioned 0x7FFFFFFF/sku0 board/sku3 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: __memcpy+0x44/0x230 cros_ec_check_features+0x60/0xcc [cros_ec_proto] cros_typec_probe+0xe8/0x6e0 [cros_ec_typec] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/rt: Have RT_PUSH_IPI be default off for non PREEMPT_RT RT migration is done aggressively. When a CPU schedules out a high priority RT task for a lower priority task, it will look to see if there's any RT tasks that are waiting to run on another CPU that is of higher priority than the task this CPU is about to run. If it finds one, it will pull that task over to the CPU and allow it to run there instead. Normally, this pulling is done by looking at the RT overloaded mask (rto) which contains all the CPUs in the scheduler domain with RT tasks that are waiting to run due to a higher priority RT task currently running on their CPU. The CPU that is about to schedule a lower priority task will grab the rq lock of the overloaded CPU and move the RT task from that CPU's runqueue to the local one and schedule the higher priority RT task. This caused issues when a lot of CPUs would schedule a lower priority task at the same time. They would all try to grab the same runqueue lock of the CPU with the overloaded RT tasks. Only the first CPU that got in will get that task. All the others would wait until they got the runqueue lock and see there's nothing to pull and do nothing. On systems with lots of CPUs, this caused a large latency (up to 500us) which is beyond what PREEMPT_RT is to allow. The solution to that was to create an RT_PUSH_IPI logic. When any CPU wanted to pull a task, instead of grabbing the runqueue lock of the overloaded CPU, it would start by sending an IPI to the overloaded CPU, and that IPI handler would have the CPU with the waiting RT task do a push instead. Then that handler would send an IPI to the next CPU with overloaded RT tasks, and so on. Note, after the first CPU starts this process, if another CPU wanted to do a pull, it would see that the process has already begun and would only increment a counter to have the IPIs continue again. The RT_PUSH_IPI solved the latency problem with PREEMPT_RT but could cause a new issue with non PREEMPT_RT. Namely, softirqs run in a threaded context on PREEMPT_RT but they can run in an interrupt context in non-RT. If an IPI lands on a CPU that has just woken up multiple RT tasks and the current CPU is running a non RT or a low priority RT task, instead of doing a push, it would simply do a schedule on that CPU. But if a softirq was also executing on this CPU, the schedule would need to wait until the softirq finished. Until then, the CPU would still be considered overloaded as there are RT tasks still waiting to run on it. A live lock occurred on a workload that was doing heavy networking traffic on a large machine where the softirqs would run 500us out of 750us. And it would also be waking up RT tasks, causing the RT pull logic to be constantly executed. When a softirq triggered on a CPU with RT tasks queued but not running yet, and the other CPUs would see this CPU as being overloaded, they would send an IPI over to it. The CPU would notice that the waiting RT tasks are of higher priority than the currently running task and simply schedule that CPU instead. But because the softirq was executing, before it could schedule, it would receive another IPI to do the same. The amount of IPIs would slow down the currently running softirq so much that before it could return back to task context, it would execute another softirq never allowing the CPU to schedule. This live locked that CPU. As RT_PUSH_IPI was created to help PREEMPT_RT, make it default off if PREEMPT_RT is not enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Validate BTF repeated field counts before expansion btf_parse_struct_metas() walks user-supplied BTF during BPF_BTF_LOAD, and btf_repeat_fields() expands repeatable fields from array elements into the fixed BTF_FIELDS_MAX scratch array used by btf_parse_fields(). The remaining-capacity check performs the expanded field count calculation in u32. A malformed BTF can wrap that calculation, causing the check to pass even when the expanded field count exceeds the scratch array capacity. The following memcpy() can then write past the end of the array. Use checked addition and multiplication before copying repeated fields and reject impossible counts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component lies within the SL record before dereferencing it. A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255 bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory. ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media - desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled. Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink() fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: wake sq waiters when the transport closes Threads parked in svc_rdma_sq_wait() on sc_sq_ticket_wait or sc_send_wait can hang indefinitely in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE state across transport teardown, pinning svc_xprt references and blocking svc_rdma_free(). The close path sets XPT_CLOSE before invoking xpo_detach and both wait_event predicates include an XPT_CLOSE term, but the predicates are re-evaluated only on wakeup. sc_sq_ticket_wait has no completion-driven wake path; it is advanced solely by the chained ticket handoff inside svc_rdma_sq_wait() itself. Without an explicit wake at close, parked threads never observe XPT_CLOSE, hold their svc_xprt_get reference forever, and svc_rdma_free() blocks on xpt_ref dropping to zero. Two close entry points reach this transport. Local teardown runs svc_rdma_detach() from svc_handle_xprt() -> svc_delete_xprt() -> xpo_detach() on a worker thread. A remote disconnect arrives at svc_rdma_cma_handler(), which calls svc_xprt_deferred_close(): that sets XPT_CLOSE and enqueues the transport but does not access either RDMA waitqueue, so a worker already parked in svc_rdma_sq_wait() never re-evaluates its predicate. With every worker parked on this transport, no thread is available to run the local teardown either, and the wake site there is unreachable. Introduce svc_rdma_xprt_deferred_close(), a thin svcrdma wrapper that calls svc_xprt_deferred_close() and then wakes both sc_sq_ticket_wait and sc_send_wait. Convert the svcrdma producers that called svc_xprt_deferred_close() directly: svc_rdma_cma_handler(), qp_event_handler(), svc_rdma_post_send_err(), svc_rdma_wc_send(), the sendto drop path, the rw completion error paths, and the recvfrom flush and read-list error paths. Wake both waitqueues from svc_rdma_detach() as well. The synchronous svc_xprt_close() path (backchannel ENOTCONN, device removal via svc_rdma_xprt_done) reaches detach without flowing through svc_xprt_deferred_close() and therefore does not invoke the new helper. [ cel: add svc_rdma_xprt_deferred_close() to complete the fix ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem) branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard). A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP, so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs no local privilege. Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the Read Response would overrun the sink buffer. This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case, because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer.