CVE Feed

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Fix possible invalid memory access after FLR In the case that the first Function Level Reset (FLR) concludes correctly, but in the second FLR the scratch area for the saved configuration cannot be allocated, it's possible for a invalid memory access to happen. Always set the deallocated scratch area to NULL after FLR completes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Fix memory leak when a wq is reset idxd_wq_disable_cleanup() which is called from the reset path for a workqueue, sets the wq type to NONE, which for other parts of the driver mean that the wq is empty (all its resources were released). Only set the wq type to NONE after its resources are released.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virt: tdx-guest: Fix handling of host controlled 'quote' buffer length Validate host controlled value `quote_buf->out_len` that determines how many bytes of the quote are copied out to guest userspace. In TDX environments with remote attestation, quotes are not considered private, and can be forwarded to an attestation server. Catch scenarios where the host specifies a response length larger than the guest's allocation, or otherwise races modifying the response while the guest consumes it. This prevents contents beyond the pages allocated for `quote_buf` (up to TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB_MAX) from being read out to guest userspace, and possibly forwarded in attestation requests. Recall that some deployments want per-container configs-tsm-report interfaces, so the leak may cross container protection boundaries, not just local root.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: only publish mode_data after clone setup iptfs_clone_state() stores x->mode_data before allocating the reorder window. If that allocation fails, the code frees the cloned state and returns -ENOMEM, leaving x->mode_data pointing at freed memory. The xfrm clone unwind later runs destroy_state() through x->mode_data, so the failed clone path tears down IPTFS state that clone_state() already freed. Keep the cloned IPTFS state private until all allocations succeed so failed clones leave x->mode_data unset. The destroy path already handles a NULL mode_data pointer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs: fix param_ctx leak on damon_sysfs_new_test_ctx() failure Patch series "mm/damon/sysfs: fix memory leak and NULL dereference issues", v4. DAMON_SYSFS can leak memory under allocation failure, and do NULL pointer dereference when a privileged user make wrong sequences of control. Fix those. This patch (of 3): When damon_sysfs_new_test_ctx() fails in damon_sysfs_commit_input(), param_ctx is leaked because the early return skips the cleanup at the out label. Destroy param_ctx before returning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: save ailp before dropping the AIL lock in push callbacks In xfs_inode_item_push() and xfs_qm_dquot_logitem_push(), the AIL lock is dropped to perform buffer IO. Once the cluster buffer no longer protects the log item from reclaim, the log item may be freed by background reclaim or the dquot shrinker. The subsequent spin_lock() call dereferences lip->li_ailp, which is a use-after-free. Fix this by saving the ailp pointer in a local variable while the AIL lock is held and the log item is guaranteed to be valid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs: check contexts->nr before accessing contexts_arr[0] Multiple sysfs command paths dereference contexts_arr[0] without first verifying that kdamond->contexts->nr == 1. A user can set nr_contexts to 0 via sysfs while DAMON is running, causing NULL pointer dereferences. In more detail, the issue can be triggered by privileged users like below. First, start DAMON and make contexts directory empty (kdamond->contexts->nr == 0). # damo start # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0 # echo 0 > contexts/nr_contexts Then, each of below commands will cause the NULL pointer dereference. # echo update_schemes_stats > state # echo update_schemes_tried_regions > state # echo update_schemes_tried_bytes > state # echo update_schemes_effective_quotas > state # echo update_tuned_intervals > state Guard all commands (except OFF) at the entry point of damon_sysfs_handle_cmd().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs: check contexts->nr in repeat_call_fn damon_sysfs_repeat_call_fn() calls damon_sysfs_upd_tuned_intervals(), damon_sysfs_upd_schemes_stats(), and damon_sysfs_upd_schemes_effective_quotas() without checking contexts->nr. If nr_contexts is set to 0 via sysfs while DAMON is running, these functions dereference contexts_arr[0] and cause a NULL pointer dereference. Add the missing check. For example, the issue can be reproduced using DAMON sysfs interface and DAMON user-space tool (damo) [1] like below. $ sudo damo start --refresh_interval 1s $ echo 0 | sudo tee \ /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0/contexts/nr_contexts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/pagewalk: fix race between concurrent split and refault The splitting of a PUD entry in walk_pud_range() can race with a concurrent thread refaulting the PUD leaf entry causing it to try walking a PMD range that has disappeared. An example and reproduction of this is to try reading numa_maps of a process while VFIO-PCI is setting up DMA (specifically the vfio_pin_pages_remote call) on a large BAR for that process. This will trigger a kernel BUG: vfio-pci 0000:03:00.0: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa23980000000 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI ... RIP: 0010:walk_pgd_range+0x3b5/0x7a0 Code: 8d 43 ff 48 89 44 24 28 4d 89 ce 4d 8d a7 00 00 20 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 49 81 e4 00 00 e0 ff 49 8d 44 24 ff 48 39 c8 4c 0f 43 e3 <49> f7 06 9f ff ff ff 75 3b 48 8b 44 24 20 48 8b 40 28 48 85 c0 74 RSP: 0018:ffffac23e1ecf808 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 00007f44c01fffff RBX: 00007f4500000000 RCX: 00007f44ffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000ffffffffff000 RDI: ffffffff93378fe0 RBP: ffffac23e1ecf918 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffffa23980000000 R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 00007f44c0200000 R13: 00007f44c0000000 R14: ffffa23980000000 R15: 00007f44c0000000 FS: 00007fe884739580(0000) GS:ffff9b7d7a9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa23980000000 CR3: 000000c0650e2005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> __walk_page_range+0x195/0x1b0 walk_page_vma+0x62/0xc0 show_numa_map+0x12b/0x3b0 seq_read_iter+0x297/0x440 seq_read+0x11d/0x140 vfs_read+0xc2/0x340 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x130 ? get_page_from_freelist+0x5c2/0x17e0 ? mas_store_prealloc+0x17e/0x360 ? vma_set_page_prot+0x4c/0xa0 ? __alloc_pages_noprof+0x14e/0x2d0 ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0x8d/0x140 ? __lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x76/0xb0 ? __folio_mod_stat+0x26/0x80 ? do_anonymous_page+0x705/0x900 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa8d/0x1000 ? __count_memcg_events+0x53/0xf0 ? handle_mm_fault+0xa5/0x360 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x342/0x640 ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare.constprop.0+0x16/0xa0 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fe88464f47e Code: c0 e9 b6 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d be 07 0b 00 e8 69 01 02 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 14 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28 RSP: 002b:00007ffe6cd9a9b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fe88464f47e RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fe884543000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fe884543000 R08: 00007fe884542010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: fffffffffffffbc5 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 </TASK> Fix this by validating the PUD entry in walk_pmd_range() using a stable snapshot (pudp_get()). If the PUD is not present or is a leaf, retry the walk via ACTION_AGAIN instead of descending further. This mirrors the retry logic in walk_pte_range(), which lets walk_pmd_range() retry if the PTE is not being got by pte_offset_map_lock().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_key: validate families in pfkey_send_migrate() syzbot was able to trigger a crash in skb_put() [1] Issue is that pfkey_send_migrate() does not check old/new families, and that set_ipsecrequest() @family argument was truncated, thus possibly overfilling the skb. Validate families early, do not wait set_ipsecrequest(). [1] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8a752120 len:392 put:16 head:ffff88802a4ad040 data:ffff88802a4ad040 tail:0x188 end:0x180 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214 ! Call Trace: <TASK> skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:219 [inline] skb_put+0x159/0x210 net/core/skbuff.c:2655 skb_put_zero include/linux/skbuff.h:2788 [inline] set_ipsecrequest net/key/af_key.c:3532 [inline] pfkey_send_migrate+0x1270/0x2e50 net/key/af_key.c:3636 km_migrate+0x155/0x260 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2848 xfrm_migrate+0x2140/0x2450 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:4705 xfrm_do_migrate+0x8ff/0xaa0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3150

A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the AdvancedSearch functionality of Silverpeas Core before version 6.4.6 allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a user's browser via crafted input.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: team: fix header_ops type confusion with non-Ethernet ports Similar to commit 950803f72547 ("bonding: fix type confusion in bond_setup_by_slave()") team has the same class of header_ops type confusion. For non-Ethernet ports, team_setup_by_port() copies port_dev->header_ops directly. When the team device later calls dev_hard_header() or dev_parse_header(), these callbacks can run with the team net_device instead of the real lower device, so netdev_priv(dev) is interpreted as the wrong private type and can crash. The syzbot report shows a crash in bond_header_create(), but the root cause is in team: the topology is gre -> bond -> team, and team calls the inherited header_ops with its own net_device instead of the lower device, so bond_header_create() receives a team device and interprets netdev_priv() as bonding private data, causing a type confusion crash. Fix this by introducing team header_ops wrappers for create/parse, selecting a team port under RCU, and calling the lower device callbacks with port->dev, so each callback always sees the correct net_device context. Also pass the selected lower device to the lower parse callback, so recursion is bounded in stacked non-Ethernet topologies and parse callbacks always run with the correct device context.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: module: Fix kernel panic when a symbol st_shndx is out of bounds The module loader doesn't check for bounds of the ELF section index in simplify_symbols(): for (i = 1; i < symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); i++) { const char *name = info->strtab + sym[i].st_name; switch (sym[i].st_shndx) { case SHN_COMMON: [...] default: /* Divert to percpu allocation if a percpu var. */ if (sym[i].st_shndx == info->index.pcpu) secbase = (unsigned long)mod_percpu(mod); else /** HERE --> **/ secbase = info->sechdrs[sym[i].st_shndx].sh_addr; sym[i].st_value += secbase; break; } } A symbol with an out-of-bounds st_shndx value, for example 0xffff (known as SHN_XINDEX or SHN_HIRESERVE), may cause a kernel panic: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ... RIP: 0010:simplify_symbols+0x2b2/0x480 ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception This can happen when module ELF is legitimately using SHN_XINDEX or when it is corrupted. Add a bounds check in simplify_symbols() to validate that st_shndx is within the valid range before using it. This issue was discovered due to a bug in llvm-objcopy, see relevant discussion for details [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/[email protected]/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_ecred_conn_req Syzbot reported a KASAN stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_build_cmd() that is triggered by a malformed Enhanced Credit Based Connection Request. The vulnerability stems from l2cap_ecred_conn_req(). The function allocates a local stack buffer (`pdu`) designed to hold a maximum of 5 Source Channel IDs (SCIDs), totaling 18 bytes. When an attacker sends a request with more than 5 SCIDs, the function calculates `rsp_len` based on this unvalidated `cmd_len` before checking if the number of SCIDs exceeds L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID. If the SCID count is too high, the function correctly jumps to the `response` label to reject the packet, but `rsp_len` retains the attacker's oversized value. Consequently, l2cap_send_cmd() is instructed to read past the end of the 18-byte `pdu` buffer, triggering a KASAN panic. Fix this by moving the assignment of `rsp_len` to after the `num_scid` boundary check. If the packet is rejected, `rsp_len` will safely remain 0, and the error response will only read the 8-byte base header from the stack.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix double-free of smc_spd_priv when tee() duplicates splice pipe buffer smc_rx_splice() allocates one smc_spd_priv per pipe_buffer and stores the pointer in pipe_buffer.private. The pipe_buf_operations for these buffers used .get = generic_pipe_buf_get, which only increments the page reference count when tee(2) duplicates a pipe buffer. The smc_spd_priv pointer itself was not handled, so after tee() both the original and the cloned pipe_buffer share the same smc_spd_priv *. When both pipes are subsequently released, smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() is called twice against the same object: 1st call: kfree(priv) sock_put(sk) smc_rx_update_cons() [correct] 2nd call: kfree(priv) sock_put(sk) smc_rx_update_cons() [UAF] KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release(), which then escalates to a NULL-pointer dereference and kernel panic via smc_rx_update_consumer() when it chases the freed priv->smc pointer: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release+0x78/0x2a0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004a45740 by task smc_splice_tee_/74 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xce/0x650 kasan_report+0xc6/0x100 smc_rx_pipe_buf_release+0x78/0x2a0 free_pipe_info+0xd4/0x130 pipe_release+0x142/0x160 __fput+0x1c6/0x490 __x64_sys_close+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 RIP: 0010:smc_rx_update_consumer+0x8d/0x350 Call Trace: <TASK> smc_rx_pipe_buf_release+0x121/0x2a0 free_pipe_info+0xd4/0x130 pipe_release+0x142/0x160 __fput+0x1c6/0x490 __x64_sys_close+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Beyond the memory-safety problem, duplicating an SMC splice buffer is semantically questionable: smc_rx_update_cons() would advance the consumer cursor twice for the same data, corrupting receive-window accounting. A refcount on smc_spd_priv could fix the double-free, but the cursor-accounting issue would still need to be addressed separately. The .get callback is invoked by both tee(2) and splice_pipe_to_pipe() for partial transfers; both will now return -EFAULT. Users who need to duplicate SMC socket data must use a copy-based read path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix ERTM re-init and zero pdu_len infinite loop l2cap_config_req() processes CONFIG_REQ for channels in BT_CONNECTED state to support L2CAP reconfiguration (e.g. MTU changes). However, since both CONF_INPUT_DONE and CONF_OUTPUT_DONE are already set from the initial configuration, the reconfiguration path falls through to l2cap_ertm_init(), which re-initializes tx_q, srej_q, srej_list, and retrans_list without freeing the previous allocations and sets chan->sdu to NULL without freeing the existing skb. This leaks all previously allocated ERTM resources. Additionally, l2cap_parse_conf_req() does not validate the minimum value of remote_mps derived from the RFC max_pdu_size option. A zero value propagates to l2cap_segment_sdu() where pdu_len becomes zero, causing the while loop to never terminate since len is never decremented, exhausting all available memory. Fix the double-init by skipping l2cap_ertm_init() and l2cap_chan_ready() when the channel is already in BT_CONNECTED state, while still allowing the reconfiguration parameters to be updated through l2cap_parse_conf_req(). Also add a pdu_len zero check in l2cap_segment_sdu() as a safeguard.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: check if ext_caps is valid in BL setup LVDS connectors don't have extended backlight caps so check if the pointer is valid before accessing it. (cherry picked from commit 3f797396d7f4eb9bb6eded184bbc6f033628a6f6)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: reject mount if bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0 bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0 is not supported, reject mounting it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests When a compound request consists of QUERY_DIRECTORY + QUERY_INFO (FILE_ALL_INFORMATION) and the first command consumes nearly the entire max_trans_size, get_file_all_info() would blindly call smbConvertToUTF16() with PATH_MAX, causing out-of-bounds write beyond the response buffer. In get_file_all_info(), there was a missing validation check for the client-provided OutputBufferLength before copying the filename into FileName field of the smb2_file_all_info structure. If the filename length exceeds the available buffer space, it could lead to potential buffer overflows or memory corruption during smbConvertToUTF16 conversion. This calculating the actual free buffer size using smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len() and returning -EINVAL if the buffer is insufficient and updating smbConvertToUTF16 to use the actual filename length (clamped by PATH_MAX) to ensure a safe copy operation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/port: Fix use after free of parent_port in cxl_detach_ep() cxl_detach_ep() is called during bottom-up removal when all CXL memory devices beneath a switch port have been removed. For each port in the hierarchy it locks both the port and its parent, removes the endpoint, and if the port is now empty, marks it dead and unregisters the port by calling delete_switch_port(). There are two places during this work where the parent_port may be used after freeing: First, a concurrent detach may have already processed a port by the time a second worker finds it via bus_find_device(). Without pinning parent_port, it may already be freed when we discover port->dead and attempt to unlock the parent_port. In a production kernel that's a silent memory corruption, with lock debug, it looks like this: []DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(__owner_task(owner) != get_current()) []WARNING: kernel/locking/mutex.c:949 at __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1ee/0x310 []Call Trace: []mutex_unlock+0xd/0x20 []cxl_detach_ep+0x180/0x400 [cxl_core] []devm_action_release+0x10/0x20 []devres_release_all+0xa8/0xe0 []device_unbind_cleanup+0xd/0xa0 []really_probe+0x1a6/0x3e0 Second, delete_switch_port() releases three devm actions registered against parent_port. The last of those is unregister_port() and it calls device_unregister() on the child port, which can cascade. If parent_port is now also empty the device core may unregister and free it too. So by the time delete_switch_port() returns, parent_port may be free, and the subsequent device_unlock(&parent_port->dev) operates on freed memory. The kernel log looks same as above, with a different offset in cxl_detach_ep(). Both of these issues stem from the absence of a lifetime guarantee between a child port and its parent port. Establish a lifetime rule for ports: child ports hold a reference to their parent device until release. Take the reference when the port is allocated and drop it when released. This ensures the parent is valid for the full lifetime of the child and eliminates the use after free window in cxl_detach_ep(). This is easily reproduced with a reload of cxl_acpi in QEMU with CXL devices present.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: apple: avoid memory leak in apple_report_fixup() The apple_report_fixup() function was returning a newly kmemdup()-allocated buffer, but never freeing it. The caller of report_fixup() does not take ownership of the returned pointer, but it *is* permitted to return a sub-portion of the input rdesc, whose lifetime is managed by the caller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix null-ptr-deref on l2cap_sock_ready_cb Before using sk pointer, check if it is null. Fix the following: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000260-0x0000000000000267] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5985 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4-00029-ga989fde763f4 #1 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-9.fc43 06/10/2025 Workqueue: events l2cap_info_timeout RIP: 0010:kasan_byte_accessible+0x12/0x30 Code: 79 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 40 d6 48 c1 ef 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <0f> b6 04 07 3c 08 0f 92 c0 c3 cc cce veth0_macvtap: entered promiscuous mode RSP: 0018:ffffc90006e0f808 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff89746018 RCX: 0000000080000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89746018 RDI: 000000000000004c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8aae3e70 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000260 R14: 0000000000000260 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880983c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005582615a5008 CR3: 000000007007e000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> __kasan_check_byte+0x12/0x40 lock_acquire+0x79/0x2e0 lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 ? l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x46/0x160 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x46/0x160 l2cap_conn_start+0x779/0xff0 ? __pfx_l2cap_conn_start+0x10/0x10 ? l2cap_info_timeout+0x60/0xa0 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 l2cap_info_timeout+0x68/0xa0 ? process_scheduled_works+0xa8d/0x18c0 process_scheduled_works+0xb6e/0x18c0 ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x3d5/0x5e0 worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 kthread+0x388/0x470 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x51e/0xb90 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 veth1_macvtap: entered promiscuous mode ? __switch_to+0xc7d/0x1450 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- batman_adv: batadv0: Interface activated: batadv_slave_0 batman_adv: batadv0: Interface activated: batadv_slave_1 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim0: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim1: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim2: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim3: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0 RIP: 0010:kasan_byte_accessible+0x12/0x30 Code: 79 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 40 d6 48 c1 ef 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <0f> b6 04 07 3c 08 0f 92 c0 c3 cc cce ieee80211 phy39: Selected rate control algorithm 'minstrel_ht' RSP: 0018:ffffc90006e0f808 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff89746018 RCX: 0000000080000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89746018 RDI: 000000000000004c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8aae3e70 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000260 R14: 0000000000000260 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880983c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f7e16139e9c CR3: 000000000e74e000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iavf: fix out-of-bounds writes in iavf_get_ethtool_stats() iavf incorrectly uses real_num_tx_queues for ETH_SS_STATS. Since the value could change in runtime, we should use num_tx_queues instead. Moreover iavf_get_ethtool_stats() uses num_active_queues while iavf_get_sset_count() and iavf_get_stat_strings() use real_num_tx_queues, which triggers out-of-bounds writes when we do "ethtool -L" and "ethtool -S" simultaneously [1]. For example when we change channels from 1 to 8, Thread 3 could be scheduled before Thread 2, and out-of-bounds writes could be triggered in Thread 3: Thread 1 (ethtool -L) Thread 2 (work) Thread 3 (ethtool -S) iavf_set_channels() ... iavf_alloc_queues() -> num_active_queues = 8 iavf_schedule_finish_config() iavf_get_sset_count() real_num_tx_queues: 1 -> buffer for 1 queue iavf_get_ethtool_stats() num_active_queues: 8 -> out-of-bounds! iavf_finish_config() -> real_num_tx_queues = 8 Use immutable num_tx_queues in all related functions to avoid the issue. [1] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270 Write of size 8 at addr ffffc900031c9080 by task ethtool/5800 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5800 Comm: ethtool Not tainted 6.19.0-enjuk-08403-g8137e3db7f1c #241 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 print_report+0x170/0x4f3 kasan_report+0xe1/0x180 iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270 iavf_get_ethtool_stats+0x14c/0x2e0 __dev_ethtool+0x3d0c/0x5830 dev_ethtool+0x12d/0x270 dev_ioctl+0x53c/0xe30 sock_do_ioctl+0x1a9/0x270 sock_ioctl+0x3d4/0x5e0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x690 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f7da0e6e36d ... </TASK> The buggy address belongs to a 1-page vmalloc region starting at 0xffffc900031c9000 allocated at __dev_ethtool+0x3cc9/0x5830 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88813a013de0 pfn:0x13a013 flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: ffff88813a013de0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffffc900031c8f80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ffffc900031c9000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffffc900031c9080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ^ ffffc900031c9100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ffffc900031c9180: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: fix teardown order issue (UAF) There is a teardown order issue in the driver. The SPI controller is registered using devm_spi_register_controller(), which delays unregistration of the SPI controller until after the fsl_lpspi_remove() function returns. As the fsl_lpspi_remove() function synchronously tears down the DMA channels, a running SPI transfer triggers the following NULL pointer dereference due to use after free: | fsl_lpspi 42550000.spi: I/O Error in DMA RX | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [...] | Call trace: | fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer+0x260/0x340 [spi_fsl_lpspi] | fsl_lpspi_transfer_one+0x198/0x448 [spi_fsl_lpspi] | spi_transfer_one_message+0x49c/0x7c8 | __spi_pump_transfer_message+0x120/0x420 | __spi_sync+0x2c4/0x520 | spi_sync+0x34/0x60 | spidev_message+0x20c/0x378 [spidev] | spidev_ioctl+0x398/0x750 [spidev] [...] Switch from devm_spi_register_controller() to spi_register_controller() in fsl_lpspi_probe() and add the corresponding spi_unregister_controller() in fsl_lpspi_remove().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_net: Fix UAF on dst_ops when IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE is cleared and napi_tx is false A UAF issue occurs when the virtio_net driver is configured with napi_tx=N and the device's IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE flag is cleared (e.g., during the configuration of tc route filter rules). When IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE is removed from the net_device, the network stack expects the driver to hold the reference to skb->dst until the packet is fully transmitted and freed. In virtio_net with napi_tx=N, skbs may remain in the virtio transmit ring for an extended period. If the network namespace is destroyed while these skbs are still pending, the corresponding dst_ops structure has freed. When a subsequent packet is transmitted, free_old_xmit() is triggered to clean up old skbs. It then calls dst_release() on the skb associated with the stale dst_entry. Since the dst_ops (referenced by the dst_entry) has already been freed, a UAF kernel paging request occurs. fix it by adds skb_dst_drop(skb) in start_xmit to explicitly release the dst reference before the skb is queued in virtio_net. Call Trace: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80007e150000 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6236 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPT ... percpu_counter_add_batch+0x3c/0x158 lib/percpu_counter.c:98 (P) dst_release+0xe0/0x110 net/core/dst.c:177 skb_release_head_state+0xe8/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:1177 sk_skb_reason_drop+0x54/0x2d8 net/core/skbuff.c:1255 dev_kfree_skb_any_reason+0x64/0x78 net/core/dev.c:3469 napi_consume_skb+0x1c4/0x3a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1527 __free_old_xmit+0x164/0x230 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:611 [virtio_net] free_old_xmit drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1081 [virtio_net] start_xmit+0x7c/0x530 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:3329 [virtio_net] ... Reproduction Steps: NETDEV="enp3s0" config_qdisc_route_filter() { tc qdisc del dev $NETDEV root tc qdisc add dev $NETDEV root handle 1: prio tc filter add dev $NETDEV parent 1:0 \ protocol ip prio 100 route to 100 flowid 1:1 ip route add 192.168.1.100/32 dev $NETDEV realm 100 } test_ns() { ip netns add testns ip link set $NETDEV netns testns ip netns exec testns ifconfig $NETDEV 10.0.32.46/24 ip netns exec testns ping -c 1 10.0.32.1 ip netns del testns } config_qdisc_route_filter test_ns sleep 2 test_ns

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: writeback: don't block sync for filesystems with no data integrity guarantees Add a SB_I_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY superblock flag for filesystems that cannot guarantee data persistence on sync (eg fuse). For superblocks with this flag set, sync kicks off writeback of dirty inodes but does not wait for the flusher threads to complete the writeback. This replaces the per-inode AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mapping flag added in commit f9a49aa302a0 ("fs/writeback: skip AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mappings in wait_sb_inodes()"). The flag belongs at the superblock level because data integrity is a filesystem-wide property, not a per-inode one. Having this flag at the superblock level also allows us to skip having to iterate every dirty inode in wait_sb_inodes() only to skip each inode individually. Prior to this commit, mappings with no data integrity guarantees skipped waiting on writeback completion but still waited on the flusher threads to finish initiating the writeback. Waiting on the flusher threads is unnecessary. This commit kicks off writeback but does not wait on the flusher threads. This change properly addresses a recent report [1] for a suspend-to-RAM hang seen on fuse-overlayfs that was caused by waiting on the flusher threads to finish: Workqueue: pm_fs_sync pm_fs_sync_work_fn Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x457/0x1720 schedule+0x27/0xd0 wb_wait_for_completion+0x97/0xe0 sync_inodes_sb+0xf8/0x2e0 __iterate_supers+0xdc/0x160 ksys_sync+0x43/0xb0 pm_fs_sync_work_fn+0x17/0xa0 process_one_work+0x193/0x350 worker_thread+0x1a1/0x310 kthread+0xfc/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x243/0x280 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> On fuse this is problematic because there are paths that may cause the flusher thread to block (eg if systemd freezes the user session cgroups first, which freezes the fuse daemon, before invoking the kernel suspend. The kernel suspend triggers ->write_node() which on fuse issues a synchronous setattr request, which cannot be processed since the daemon is frozen. Or if the daemon is buggy and cannot properly complete writeback, initiating writeback on a dirty folio already under writeback leads to writeback_get_folio() -> folio_prepare_writeback() -> unconditional wait on writeback to finish, which will cause a hang). This commit restores fuse to its prior behavior before tmp folios were removed, where sync was essentially a no-op. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAJnrk1a-asuvfrbKXbEwwDSctvemF+6zfhdnuzO65Pt8HsFSRw@mail.gmail.com/T/#m632c4648e9cafc4239299887109ebd880ac6c5c1

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: avoid dereferencing log items after push callbacks After xfsaild_push_item() calls iop_push(), the log item may have been freed if the AIL lock was dropped during the push. Background inode reclaim or the dquot shrinker can free the log item while the AIL lock is not held, and the tracepoints in the switch statement dereference the log item after iop_push() returns. Fix this by capturing the log item type, flags, and LSN before calling xfsaild_push_item(), and introducing a new xfs_ail_push_class trace event class that takes these pre-captured values and the ailp pointer instead of the log item pointer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: publish jinode after initialization ext4_inode_attach_jinode() publishes ei->jinode to concurrent users. It used to set ei->jinode before jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(), allowing a reader to observe a non-NULL jinode with i_vfs_inode still unset. The fast commit flush path can then pass this jinode to jbd2_wait_inode_data(), which dereferences i_vfs_inode->i_mapping and may crash. Below is the crash I observe: ``` BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000010beb47f4 PGD 110e51067 P4D 110e51067 PUD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4850 Comm: fc_fsync_bench_ Not tainted 6.18.0-00764-g795a690c06a5 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:xas_find_marked+0x3d/0x2e0 Code: e0 03 48 83 f8 02 0f 84 f0 01 00 00 48 8b 47 08 48 89 c3 48 39 c6 0f 82 fd 01 00 00 48 85 c9 74 3d 48 83 f9 03 77 63 4c 8b 0f <49> 8b 71 08 48 c7 47 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 f1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02 RSP: 0018:ffffbbee806e7bf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000010beb4 RBX: 000000000010beb4 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000002000300000 RDI: ffffbbee806e7c10 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000002000300000 R09: 000000010beb47ec R10: ffff9ea494590090 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000002000300000 R13: ffffbbee806e7c90 R14: ffff9ea494513788 R15: ffffbbee806e7c88 FS: 00007fc2f9e3e6c0(0000) GS:ffff9ea6b1444000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000010beb47f4 CR3: 0000000119ac5000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> filemap_get_folios_tag+0x87/0x2a0 __filemap_fdatawait_range+0x5f/0xd0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __schedule+0x3e7/0x10c0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? cap_safe_nice+0x37/0x70 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors+0x12/0x40 ext4_fc_commit+0x697/0x8b0 ? ext4_file_write_iter+0x64b/0x950 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? vfs_write+0x356/0x480 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ext4_sync_file+0xf7/0x370 do_fsync+0x3b/0x80 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x108/0x1d0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ... ``` Fix this by initializing the jbd2_inode first. Use smp_wmb() and WRITE_ONCE() to publish ei->jinode after initialization. Readers use READ_ONCE() to fetch the pointer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: avoid infinite loops caused by residual data On the mkdir/mknod path, when mapping logical blocks to physical blocks, if inserting a new extent into the extent tree fails (in this example, because the file system disabled the huge file feature when marking the inode as dirty), ext4_ext_map_blocks() only calls ext4_free_blocks() to reclaim the physical block without deleting the corresponding data in the extent tree. This causes subsequent mkdir operations to reference the previously reclaimed physical block number again, even though this physical block is already being used by the xattr block. Therefore, a situation arises where both the directory and xattr are using the same buffer head block in memory simultaneously. The above causes ext4_xattr_block_set() to enter an infinite loop about "inserted" and cannot release the inode lock, ultimately leading to the 143s blocking problem mentioned in [1]. If the metadata is corrupted, then trying to remove some extent space can do even more harm. Also in case EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE was passed, remove space wrongly update quota information. Jan Kara suggests distinguishing between two cases: 1) The error is ENOSPC or EDQUOT - in this case the filesystem is fully consistent and we must maintain its consistency including all the accounting. However these errors can happen only early before we've inserted the extent into the extent tree. So current code works correctly for this case. 2) Some other error - this means metadata is corrupted. We should strive to do as few modifications as possible to limit damage. So I'd just skip freeing of allocated blocks. [1] INFO: task syz.0.17:5995 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Call Trace: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1073 [inline] __start_dirop fs/namei.c:2923 [inline] start_dirop fs/namei.c:2934 [inline]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: magicmouse: avoid memory leak in magicmouse_report_fixup() The magicmouse_report_fixup() function was returning a newly kmemdup()-allocated buffer, but never freeing it. The caller of report_fixup() does not take ownership of the returned pointer, but it *is* permitted to return a sub-portion of the input rdesc, whose lifetime is managed by the caller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: esp: fix skb leak with espintcp and async crypto When the TX queue for espintcp is full, esp_output_tail_tcp will return an error and not free the skb, because with synchronous crypto, the common xfrm output code will drop the packet for us. With async crypto (esp_output_done), we need to drop the skb when esp_output_tail_tcp returns an error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: fix skb_put() panic on non-linear skb during reassembly In iptfs_reassem_cont(), IP-TFS attempts to append data to the new inner packet 'newskb' that is being reassembled. First a zero-copy approach is tried if it succeeds then newskb becomes non-linear. When a subsequent fragment in the same datagram does not meet the fast-path conditions, a memory copy is performed. It calls skb_put() to append the data and as newskb is non-linear it triggers SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT check. Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] RIP: 0010:skb_put+0x3c/0x40 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> iptfs_reassem_cont+0x1ab/0x5e0 [xfrm_iptfs] iptfs_input_ordered+0x2af/0x380 [xfrm_iptfs] iptfs_input+0x122/0x3e0 [xfrm_iptfs] xfrm_input+0x91e/0x1a50 xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x3a/0x110 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1d7/0x1f0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0xbe/0x1e0 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xb56/0x1120 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x133/0x2b0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1ff/0x3f0 napi_complete_done+0x81/0x220 virtnet_poll+0x9d6/0x116e [virtio_net] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x2b/0x270 net_rx_action+0x162/0x360 handle_softirqs+0xdc/0x510 __irq_exit_rcu+0xe7/0x110 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> Fix this by checking if the skb is non-linear. If it is, linearize it by calling skb_linearize(). As the initial allocation of newskb originally reserved enough tailroom for the entire reassembled packet we do not need to check if we have enough tailroom or extend it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: set fileio bio failed in short read case For file-backed mount, IO requests are handled by vfs_iocb_iter_read(). However, it can be interrupted by SIGKILL, returning the number of bytes actually copied. Unused folios in bio are unexpectedly marked as uptodate. vfs_read filemap_read filemap_get_pages filemap_readahead erofs_fileio_readahead erofs_fileio_rq_submit vfs_iocb_iter_read filemap_read filemap_get_pages <= detect signal erofs_fileio_ki_complete <= set all folios uptodate This patch addresses this by setting short read bio with an error directly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: fix circular locking dependency in nci_close_device nci_close_device() flushes rx_wq and tx_wq while holding req_lock. This causes a circular locking dependency because nci_rx_work() running on rx_wq can end up taking req_lock too: nci_rx_work -> nci_rx_data_packet -> nci_data_exchange_complete -> __sk_destruct -> rawsock_destruct -> nfc_deactivate_target -> nci_deactivate_target -> nci_request -> mutex_lock(&ndev->req_lock) Move the flush of rx_wq after req_lock has been released. This should safe (I think) because NCI_UP has already been cleared and the transport is closed, so the work will see it and return -ENETDOWN. NIPA has been hitting this running the nci selftest with a debug kernel on roughly 4% of the runs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmasp: fix double free of WoL irq We do not need to free wol_irq since it was instantiated with devm_request_irq(). So devres will free for us.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: clamp SCO altsetting table indices btusb_work() maps the number of active SCO links to USB alternate settings through a three-entry lookup table when CVSD traffic uses transparent voice settings. The lookup currently indexes alts[] with data->sco_num - 1 without first constraining sco_num to the number of available table entries. While the table only defines alternate settings for up to three SCO links, data->sco_num comes from hci_conn_num() and is used directly. Cap the lookup to the last table entry before indexing it so the driver keeps selecting the highest supported alternate setting without reading past alts[].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Initialize free_qp completion before using it In irdma_create_qp, if ib_copy_to_udata fails, it will call irdma_destroy_qp to clean up which will attempt to wait on the free_qp completion, which is not initialized yet. Fix this by initializing the completion before the ib_copy_to_udata call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN The BPF interpreter's signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation (include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000), abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as 0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result. The verifier's abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds map value access. Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32 before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8 abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter's sdiv32/smod32 handlers. s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do not use abs().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP during subvol create We have recently observed a number of subvolumes with broken dentries. ls-ing the parent dir looks like: drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 16 Jan 23 16:49 . drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 24 Jan 23 16:48 .. d????????? ? ? ? ? ? broken_subvol and similarly stat-ing the file fails. In this state, deleting the subvol fails with ENOENT, but attempting to create a new file or subvol over it errors out with EEXIST and even aborts the fs. Which leaves us a bit stuck. dmesg contains a single notable error message reading: "could not do orphan cleanup -2" 2 is ENOENT and the error comes from the failure handling path of btrfs_orphan_cleanup(), with the stack leading back up to btrfs_lookup(). btrfs_lookup btrfs_lookup_dentry btrfs_orphan_cleanup // prints that message and returns -ENOENT After some detailed inspection of the internal state, it became clear that: - there are no orphan items for the subvol - the subvol is otherwise healthy looking, it is not half-deleted or anything, there is no drop progress, etc. - the subvol was created a while ago and does the meaningful first btrfs_orphan_cleanup() call that sets BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP much later. - after btrfs_orphan_cleanup() fails, btrfs_lookup_dentry() returns -ENOENT, which results in a negative dentry for the subvolume via d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry), leading to the observed behavior. The bug can be mitigated by dropping the dentry cache, at which point we can successfully delete the subvolume if we want. i.e., btrfs_lookup() btrfs_lookup_dentry() if (!sb_rdonly(inode->vfs_inode)->vfs_inode) btrfs_orphan_cleanup(sub_root) test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP) btrfs_search_slot() // finds orphan item for inode N ... prints "could not do orphan cleanup -2" if (inode == ERR_PTR(-ENOENT)) inode = NULL; return d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry) // NEGATIVE DENTRY for valid subvolume btrfs_orphan_cleanup() does test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP) on the root when it runs, so it cannot run more than once on a given root, so something else must run concurrently. However, the obvious routes to deleting an orphan when nlinks goes to 0 should not be able to run without first doing a lookup into the subvolume, which should run btrfs_orphan_cleanup() and set the bit. The final important observation is that create_subvol() calls d_instantiate_new() but does not set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP, so if the dentry cache gets dropped, the next lookup into the subvolume will make a real call into btrfs_orphan_cleanup() for the first time. This opens up the possibility of concurrently deleting the inode/orphan items but most typical evict() paths will be holding a reference on the parent dentry (child dentry holds parent->d_lockref.count via dget in d_alloc(), released in __dentry_kill()) and prevent the parent from being removed from the dentry cache. The one exception is delayed iputs. Ordered extent creation calls igrab() on the inode. If the file is unlinked and closed while those refs are held, iput() in __dentry_kill() decrements i_count but does not trigger eviction (i_count > 0). The child dentry is freed and the subvol dentry's d_lockref.count drops to 0, making it evictable while the inode is still alive. Since there are two races (the race between writeback and unlink and the race between lookup and delayed iputs), and there are too many moving parts, the following three diagrams show the complete picture. (Only the second and third are races) Phase 1: Create Subvol in dentry cache without BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP set btrfs_mksubvol() lookup_one_len() __lookup_slow() d_alloc_parallel() __d_alloc() // d_lockref.count = 1 create_subvol(dentry) // doesn't touch the bit.. d_instantiate_new(dentry, inode) // dentry in cache with d_lockref.c ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate PDU length before reading SDU length in l2cap_ecred_data_rcv() l2cap_ecred_data_rcv() reads the SDU length field from skb->data using get_unaligned_le16() without first verifying that skb contains at least L2CAP_SDULEN_SIZE (2) bytes. When skb->len is less than 2, this reads past the valid data in the skb. The ERTM reassembly path correctly calls pskb_may_pull() before reading the SDU length (l2cap_reassemble_sdu, L2CAP_SAR_START case). Apply the same validation to the Enhanced Credit Based Flow Control data path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: Avoid releasing netdev before teardown completes The patch cited in the Fixes tag below changed the teardown code for OVS ports to no longer unconditionally take the RTNL. After this change, the netdev_destroy() callback can proceed immediately to the call_rcu() invocation if the IFF_OVS_DATAPATH flag is already cleared on the netdev. The ovs_netdev_detach_dev() function clears the flag before completing the unregistration, and if it gets preempted after clearing the flag (as can happen on an -rt kernel), netdev_destroy() can complete and the device can be freed before the unregistration completes. This leads to a splat like: [ 998.393867] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xff00000001000239: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 998.393877] CPU: 42 UID: 0 PID: 55177 Comm: ip Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.1.1.el10_2.x86_64+rt #1 PREEMPT_RT [ 998.393886] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/0JMK61, BIOS 2.24.0 03/27/2025 [ 998.393889] RIP: 0010:dev_set_promiscuity+0x8d/0xa0 [ 998.393901] Code: 00 00 75 d8 48 8b 53 08 48 83 ba b0 02 00 00 00 75 ca 48 83 c4 08 5b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 83 bf 48 09 00 00 00 75 91 48 8b 47 08 <48> 83 b8 b0 02 00 00 00 74 97 eb 81 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 [ 998.393906] RSP: 0018:ffffce5864a5f6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 998.393912] RAX: ff00000000ffff89 RBX: ffff894d0adf5a05 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 998.393917] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff894d0adf5a05 [ 998.393921] RBP: ffff894d19252000 R08: ffff894d19252000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 998.393924] R10: ffff894d19252000 R11: ffff894d192521b8 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 998.393927] R13: ffffce5864a5f738 R14: 00000000ffffffe2 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 998.393931] FS: 00007fad61971800(0000) GS:ffff894cc0140000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 998.393936] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 998.393940] CR2: 000055df0a2a6e40 CR3: 000000011c7fe003 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [ 998.393944] PKRU: 55555554 [ 998.393946] Call Trace: [ 998.393949] <TASK> [ 998.393952] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 998.393961] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 998.393975] ? dp_device_event+0x41/0x80 [openvswitch] [ 998.394009] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12 [ 998.394016] ? die_addr+0x3c/0x60 [ 998.394027] ? exc_general_protection+0x16d/0x390 [ 998.394042] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [ 998.394058] ? dev_set_promiscuity+0x8d/0xa0 [ 998.394066] ? ovs_netdev_detach_dev+0x3a/0x80 [openvswitch] [ 998.394092] dp_device_event+0x41/0x80 [openvswitch] [ 998.394102] notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0xd0 [ 998.394106] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x51b/0xa60 [ 998.394110] rtnl_dellink+0x169/0x3e0 [ 998.394121] ? rt_mutex_slowlock.constprop.0+0x95/0xd0 [ 998.394125] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x142/0x3f0 [ 998.394128] ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x69/0xf0 [ 998.394130] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 998.394132] netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100 [ 998.394138] netlink_unicast+0x292/0x3f0 [ 998.394141] netlink_sendmsg+0x21b/0x470 [ 998.394145] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39d/0x3d0 [ 998.394149] ___sys_sendmsg+0x9a/0xe0 [ 998.394156] __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xd0 [ 998.394160] do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x170 [ 998.394162] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 998.394165] RIP: 0033:0x7fad61bf4724 [ 998.394188] Code: 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bb 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 e9 0c 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 [ 998.394189] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7e2f7cb8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 998.394191] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fad61bf4724 [ 998.394193] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd7e2f7d20 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 998.394194] RBP: 00007ffd7e2f7d90 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 000000000000003f [ 998.394195] R10: 000055df11558010 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffd7e2 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: skip expectations in other netns via proc Skip expectations that do not reside in this netns. Similar to e77e6ff502ea ("netfilter: conntrack: do not dump other netns's conntrack entries via proc").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: macb: use the current queue number for stats There's a potential mismatch between the memory reserved for statistics and the amount of memory written. gem_get_sset_count() correctly computes the number of stats based on the active queues, whereas gem_get_ethtool_stats() indiscriminately copies data using the maximum number of queues, and in the case the number of active queues is less than MACB_MAX_QUEUES, this results in a OOB write as observed in the KASAN splat. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in gem_get_ethtool_stats+0x54/0x78 [macb] Write of size 760 at addr ffff80008080b000 by task ethtool/1027 CPU: [...] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: raspberrypi rpi/rpi, BIOS 2025.10 10/01/2025 Call trace: show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xf8 print_report+0x384/0x5e0 kasan_report+0xa0/0xf0 kasan_check_range+0xe8/0x190 __asan_memcpy+0x54/0x98 gem_get_ethtool_stats+0x54/0x78 [macb 926c13f3af83b0c6fe64badb21ec87d5e93fcf65] dev_ethtool+0x1220/0x38c0 dev_ioctl+0x4ac/0xca8 sock_do_ioctl+0x170/0x1d8 sock_ioctl+0x484/0x5d8 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x1b8 invoke_syscall+0xd4/0x258 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb4/0x240 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x68 el0_svc+0x40/0xf8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8 el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b8 The buggy address belongs to a 1-page vmalloc region starting at 0xffff80008080b000 allocated at dev_ethtool+0x11f0/0x38c0 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff00000a333000 pfn:0xa333 flags: 0x7fffc000000000(node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) raw: 007fffc000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: ffff00000a333000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff80008080b080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff80008080b100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff80008080b180: 00 00 00 00 00 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ^ ffff80008080b200: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ffff80008080b280: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ================================================================== Fix it by making sure the copied size only considers the active number of queues.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: use generic driver_override infrastructure When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match() callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF. Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking care of proper locking internally. Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock held is intentional. [1] Also note that we do not enable the driver_override feature of struct bus_type, as SPI - in contrast to most other buses - passes "" to sysfs_emit() when the driver_override pointer is NULL. Thus, printing "\n" instead of "(null)\n".

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: always keep track of remap prev/next During 3D workload, user is reporting hitting: [ 413.361679] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c:1217 at vm_bind_ioctl_ops_unwind+0x1e2/0x2e0 [xe], CPU#7: vkd3d_queue/9925 [ 413.361944] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 9925 Comm: vkd3d_queue Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-070000rc3-generic #202603090038 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 413.361949] RIP: 0010:vm_bind_ioctl_ops_unwind+0x1e2/0x2e0 [xe] [ 413.362074] RSP: 0018:ffffd4c25c3df930 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 413.362077] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8f3ee817ed10 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 413.362078] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 413.362079] RBP: ffffd4c25c3df980 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 413.362081] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8f41fbf99380 [ 413.362082] R13: ffff8f3ee817e968 R14: 00000000ffffffef R15: ffff8f43d00bd380 [ 413.362083] FS: 00000001040ff6c0(0000) GS:ffff8f4696d89000(0000) knlGS:00000000330b0000 [ 413.362085] CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 413.362086] CR2: 00007ddfc4747000 CR3: 00000002e6262005 CR4: 0000000000f72ef0 [ 413.362088] PKRU: 55555554 [ 413.362089] Call Trace: [ 413.362092] <TASK> [ 413.362096] xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0xa9a/0xc60 [xe] Which seems to hint that the vma we are re-inserting for the ops unwind is either invalid or overlapping with something already inserted in the vm. It shouldn't be invalid since this is a re-insertion, so must have worked before. Leaving the likely culprit as something already placed where we want to insert the vma. Following from that, for the case where we do something like a rebind in the middle of a vma, and one or both mapped ends are already compatible, we skip doing the rebind of those vma and set next/prev to NULL. As well as then adjust the original unmap va range, to avoid unmapping the ends. However, if we trigger the unwind path, we end up with three va, with the two ends never being removed and the original va range in the middle still being the shrunken size. If this occurs, one failure mode is when another unwind op needs to interact with that range, which can happen with a vector of binds. For example, if we need to re-insert something in place of the original va. In this case the va is still the shrunken version, so when removing it and then doing a re-insert it can overlap with the ends, which were never removed, triggering a warning like above, plus leaving the vm in a bad state. With that, we need two things here: 1) Stop nuking the prev/next tracking for the skip cases. Instead relying on checking for skip prev/next, where needed. That way on the unwind path, we now correctly remove both ends. 2) Undo the unmap va shrinkage, on the unwind path. With the two ends now removed the unmap va should expand back to the original size again, before re-insertion. v2: - Update the explanation in the commit message, based on an actual IGT of triggering this issue, rather than conjecture. - Also undo the unmap shrinkage, for the skip case. With the two ends now removed, the original unmap va range should expand back to the original range. v3: - Track the old start/range separately. vma_size/start() uses the va info directly. (cherry picked from commit aec6969f75afbf4e01fd5fb5850ed3e9c27043ac)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload Add validation of the inner IPv4 packet tot_len and ihl fields parsed from decrypted IPTFS payloads in __input_process_payload(). A crafted ESP packet containing an inner IPv4 header with tot_len=0 causes an infinite loop: iplen=0 leads to capturelen=min(0, remaining)=0, so the data offset never advances and the while(data < tail) loop never terminates, spinning forever in softirq context. Reject inner IPv4 packets where tot_len < ihl*4 or ihl*4 < sizeof(struct iphdr), which catches both the tot_len=0 case and malformed ihl values. The normal IP stack performs this validation in ip_rcv_core(), but IPTFS extracts and processes inner packets before they reach that layer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix leak of kobject name for sub-group space_info When create_space_info_sub_group() allocates elements of space_info->sub_group[], kobject_init_and_add() is called for each element via btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type(). However, when check_removing_space_info() frees these elements, it does not call btrfs_sysfs_remove_space_info() on them. As a result, kobject_put() is not called and the associated kobj->name objects are leaked. This memory leak is reproduced by running the blktests test case zbd/009 on kernels built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK. The kmemleak feature reports the following error: unreferenced object 0xffff888112877d40 (size 16): comm "mount", pid 1244, jiffies 4294996972 hex dump (first 16 bytes): 64 61 74 61 2d 72 65 6c 6f 63 00 c4 c6 a7 cb 7f data-reloc...... backtrace (crc 53ffde4d): __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x619/0x870 kstrdup+0x42/0xc0 kobject_set_name_vargs+0x44/0x110 kobject_init_and_add+0xcf/0x150 btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type+0xfc/0x210 [btrfs] create_space_info_sub_group.constprop.0+0xfb/0x1b0 [btrfs] create_space_info+0x211/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_init_space_info+0x15a/0x1b0 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x33c7/0x4a50 [btrfs] btrfs_get_tree.cold+0x9f/0x1ee [btrfs] vfs_get_tree+0x87/0x2f0 vfs_cmd_create+0xbd/0x280 __do_sys_fsconfig+0x3df/0x990 do_syscall_64+0x136/0x1540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e To avoid the leak, call btrfs_sysfs_remove_space_info() instead of kfree() for the elements.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/region: Fix leakage in __construct_region() Failing the first sysfs_update_group() needs to explicitly kfree the resource as it is too early for cxl_region_iomem_release() to do so.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Make sure to use pmu_ctx->pmu for groups Oliver reported that x86_pmu_del() ended up doing an out-of-bound memory access when group_sched_in() fails and needs to roll back. This *should* be handled by the transaction callbacks, but he found that when the group leader is a software event, the transaction handlers of the wrong PMU are used. Despite the move_group case in perf_event_open() and group_sched_in() using pmu_ctx->pmu. Turns out, inherit uses event->pmu to clone the events, effectively undoing the move_group case for all inherited contexts. Fix this by also making inherit use pmu_ctx->pmu, ensuring all inherited counters end up in the same pmu context. Similarly, __perf_event_read() should use equally use pmu_ctx->pmu for the group case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix exception exit lock checking for subprogs process_bpf_exit_full() passes check_lock = !curframe to check_resource_leak(), which is false in cases when bpf_throw() is called from a static subprog. This makes check_resource_leak() to skip validation of active_rcu_locks, active_preempt_locks, and active_irq_id on exception exits from subprogs. At runtime bpf_throw() unwinds the stack via ORC without releasing any user-acquired locks, which may cause various issues as the result. Fix by setting check_lock = true for exception exits regardless of curframe, since exceptions bypass all intermediate frame cleanup. Update the error message prefix to "bpf_throw" for exception exits to distinguish them from normal BPF_EXIT. Fix reject_subprog_with_rcu_read_lock test which was previously passing for the wrong reason. Test program returned directly from the subprog call without closing the RCU section, so the error was triggered by the unclosed RCU lock on normal exit, not by bpf_throw. Update __msg annotations for affected tests to match the new "bpf_throw" error prefix. The spin_lock case is not affected because they are already checked [1] at the call site in do_check_insn() before bpf_throw can run. [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/kernel/bpf/verifier.c?h=v7.0-rc4#n21098