CVE Feed

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: hvs/v3d: Fix null dereference in unbind The hvs and v3d drivers use dev_get_drvdata(master) in their unbind functions. Since the vc4-drm gets removed before its dependent drivers (vc4_hvs/vc4_v3d) the vc4_hvs_unbind/vc4_v3d_unbind functions try to get drvdata of its master and fails with a null dereference error. Use the data pointer passed to the unbind functions directly instead of dev_get_drvdata(master). This avoids using potentially freed memory.

The 'podman quadlet install --replace' command opens the existing destination file with O_CREATE|O_WRONLY but omits O_TRUNC. When the initial reflink copy attempt fails (common on non-reflink-capable filesystems including many RHEL default XFS configurations), the fallback in ReflinkOrCopy uses io.Copy which performs a non-truncating write. If the original Quadlet is larger than the new Quadlet, the file is not truncated and content from the original is preserved. The command completes with no warning. There is no risk of information leakage as the user already had access to the Quadlet in order to replace it, and in most cases, this would only lead to invalid Quadlet files. However, security-related options from the end of the old Quadlet could be included in the new Quadlet, and if the truncation resulted in a valid Quadlet file, this could result in undesirable behavior. For example, running podman quadlet install --replace to remove a single line from the end of a Quadlet - including security-sensitive content, like AddCapability - will fail, and the option will continue to be used. Further, with Volume Quadlets, this can include additional mounts which can cause content to be unintentionally exposed into containers. If, later, the image is updated then compromised content might be leaked to an attacker. The vulnerable code paths are in pkg/domain/infra/abi/quadlet.go (lines 338-360, O_CREATE|O_WRONLY without O_TRUNC) and vendor/go.podman.io/storage/pkg/fileutils/reflink_linux.go (lines 12-19, non-truncating io.Copy fallback).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_ffa: Fix Endpoint Memory Access Descriptor offset calculation Use the descriptor's `ep_mem_offset` to calculate the start of the endpoint memory access array and to comply with the FF-A spec instead of defaulting to `sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region)`. This requires moving `ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()` earlier in the setup flow. Also, add sanity checks to ensure the calculated descriptor offsets do not exceed `max_fragsize`.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: set new_stream to NULL after release In dm_update_crtc_state(), the skip_modeset path releases new_stream via dc_stream_release() but does not set the pointer to NULL. If a later error (e.g., color management failure) triggers the fail label, the error path calls dc_stream_release() again on the same dangling pointer, causing a double release and potential use-after-free. Fix this by setting new_stream to NULL after the initial release. (cherry picked from commit 99f3af19073b3ddbfd96e789124cce12c4277b28)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Prevent rereg_mr for non-mem regions When a QP/CQ/SRQ is created, a two step process is used where the buffer is allocated in userspace and explicitly registered with the normal reg_mr mechanism prior to creating the actual QP/CQ/SRQ object. These special registrations are indicated via an ABI field so the driver knows that they do not have a valid mkey and to skip the actual CQP command submission. Since these are real MR objects from the core's perspective, it is possible for a user application to invoke rereg_mr on them and cause a real CQP op to be emitted with the zero-initialized mkey value of 0. Fix this by preventing rereg_mr on these special regions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vm: Fix SVM leak on resv obj alloc failure in xe_vm_create() Commit 9e9787414882 ("drm/xe/userptr: replace xe_hmm with gpusvm") made xe_svm_init() unconditional in xe_vm_create() and extended it to also initialize a "simple" gpusvm state for non-fault-mode VMs. The matching xe_svm_fini() call in xe_vm_close_and_put() was updated to run unconditionally, but the error unwind path in xe_vm_create() was not. On the drm_gpuvm_resv_object_alloc() failure path, xe_svm_init() has already succeeded but xe_svm_fini() is only called when XE_VM_FLAG_FAULT_MODE is set. For non-fault-mode VMs this leaves vm->svm.gpusvm partially initialized and leaks the resources allocated by drm_gpusvm_init(). For fault-mode VMs, xe_svm_init() additionally acquires the pagemap owner via drm_pagemap_acquire_owner() and the pagemaps via xe_svm_get_pagemaps(). Those resources are released by xe_svm_close(), not xe_svm_fini(). On the same error path, xe_svm_close() is not called either, so fault-mode VMs leak the pagemap owner and pagemaps. Fix both leaks: - Call xe_svm_fini() unconditionally on the err_svm_fini path, matching the unconditional xe_svm_init() call. Move the vm->size = 0 assignment out of the conditional so the xe_vm_is_closed() assert in xe_svm_fini() (and xe_svm_close()) holds for both modes. - Call xe_svm_close() for fault-mode VMs before xe_svm_fini(), matching the ordering used in xe_vm_close_and_put(). (cherry picked from commit ca2a3587d577ba764e0fe628fb676244fc33ddd4)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vm: Fix BO prefetch with CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC When prefetch region is DRM_XE_CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC for a BO VMA, the code used it as an index into region_to_mem_type[], causing an out-of-bounds access since the value is -1. Resolve the preferred location for BO VMAs directly: local VRAM on dGFX (using the BO's tile placement) or system memory on iGPU. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. v2: -Fix null dereference (cherry picked from commit d9a4906ac03be9f6ed3f3b45c56c866b867fd75b)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() The vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only valid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is called and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject to modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm->task_info in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a use after unlock problem. Remove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() through removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from amdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while it is still in use. (cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: drain a slave's callback before its master detaches it snd_timer_close_locked() drains the closing instance's own in-flight callback (IFLG_CALLBACK) before freeing it, but not its slaves'. When a master instance is closed, remove_slave_links() clears each slave's ->timer; the slave's own close then reads timer == NULL and takes the branch that skips the drain entirely (snd_timer_stop_slave() also no-ops on a NULL timer). So a slave whose callback is still running when the master is closed is freed underneath the live callback, leading to use-after-free. Drain the slaves too before remove_slave_links() severs them. snd_timer_stop() has already taken this instance off the active list, so no new slave callback can be queued. Take the slaves off the ack list so a pending one can't fire either, then wait for any that is already in flight.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB access from firmware ADDBA window size aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access. Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first, then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of proceeding with a broken allocation size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight() If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads may occur when decoding this part. This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore, osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a multiplication overflow are treated as invalid. [ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy(). Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: reject mapping a reserved doorbell to a new queue When creating an user-queue, the user space provides a doorbell BO handle and an offset within the bo to obtain a doorbell. However current implementation using xa_store_irq() to store a doorbell, which allows a later queue created with the same BO and offset parameters to overwrite an existing queue and doorbell mapping. This can cause problems like misrouting fence IRQ processing to a wrong queue, and mislead the cleanup process of one queue erasing the mapping of another queue. This commit fixes this issue by replacing xa_store_irq with xa_insert_irq, which rejects mapping a reserved doorbell to a newly created queue (cherry picked from commit 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: stop hardware after post-start probe failures wacom_parse_and_register() starts HID hardware before registering inputs and initializing pad LEDs/remotes. Those later steps can fail, but their error paths currently release Wacom resources without stopping the HID hardware. Route post-hid_hw_start() failures through hid_hw_stop() before releasing driver resources. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the (re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event: sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len]; len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control; sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len; event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated, and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter. On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie). An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len. The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification. A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode. Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len, a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length, so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE] rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617 ("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe() A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating executable-related rules. When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then, audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path, leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking deadlock: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by mv/5099: #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13) at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0 #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3) at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0 #2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1) at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 #3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5) at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0 #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu) at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0 #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex) at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0 stack backtrace: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00 __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360 down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230 __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40 audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0 audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0 audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00 audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0 audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0 send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0 fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0 fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630 vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0 do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c </TASK> The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running the script below: audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh -------------------------- #!/bin/bash auditctl -D mkdir -p /tmp/foo touch /tmp/file auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file rm -Rf /tmp/foo This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the kern_path_parent() path resol ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: fix devconf_all NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, the devconf_all is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init() is called which initializes it. bond_send_validate(), however, will still call bond_ns_send_all() even ipv6 is indeed disabled. It will lead to NULL derefence of net->ipv6.devconf_all in ip6_pol_route(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c [...] Workqueue: bond0 bond_arp_monitor [bonding] RIP: 0010:ip6_pol_route+0x69/0x480 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __pfx_ip6_pol_route_output+0x10/0x10 fib6_rule_lookup+0xfe/0x260 ? wakeup_preempt+0x8a/0x90 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? sched_balance_rq+0x369/0x810 ip6_route_output_flags+0xd7/0x170 bond_ns_send_all+0xde/0x280 [bonding] bond_ab_arp_probe+0x296/0x320 [bonding] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f bond_activebackup_arp_mon+0xb4/0x2c0 [bonding] process_one_work+0x196/0x370 worker_thread+0x1af/0x320 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe3/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x199/0x260 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Fix this by adding ipv6_mod_enabled() condition check in the caller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix u16 MTU truncation in media and bearer MTU validation Both TIPC_NL_MEDIA_SET and TIPC_NL_BEARER_SET accept user-supplied MTU values but only enforce a minimum bound, not a maximum. When a user sets the MTU to a value exceeding U16_MAX (65535), it passes validation but is silently truncated when assigned to u16 fields l->mtu and l->advertised_mtu in tipc_link_create(). Values like 65536 (0x10000) truncate to 0, causing a division by zero in tipc_link_set_queue_limits() which computes TIPC_MAX_PUBL / (l->mtu / ITEM_SIZE). Other overflowing values (e.g. 65537-131071) produce small incorrect MTU values, resulting in link malfunction behaviors. Crash stack (triggered as unprivileged user via user namespace): tipc_link_set_queue_limits net/tipc/link.c:2531 tipc_link_create net/tipc/link.c:520 tipc_node_check_dest net/tipc/node.c:1279 tipc_disc_rcv net/tipc/discover.c:252 tipc_rcv net/tipc/node.c:2129 tipc_udp_recv net/tipc/udp_media.c:392 Two independent paths lack the upper bound check: 1. tipc_udp_mtu_bad() -- called from __tipc_nl_media_set() (MEDIA_SET) 2. inline check in __tipc_nl_bearer_set() at bearer.c:1160 (BEARER_SET) Fix both by rejecting MTU values above U16_MAX.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (corsair-psu) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO. This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within corsairpsu_probe(). If the probe operation fails after "io start" has been initiated, this race condition will result in a uaf vulnerability [1]. CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== corsairpsu_probe() hid_device_io_start() ... unlock driver_input_lock hid_hw_stop() kfree(hidraw) __hid_input_report() ... acquire driver_input_lock hid_report_raw_event() hidraw_report_event() ... access hidraw's list_lock // trigger uaf Consequently, when corsairpsu_probe() fails and hid_hw_stop() needs to be executed, the io_started flag is first cleared while holding the driver_input_lock to prevent potential race conditions involving input reports. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt_spin_lock+0x83/0x400 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:56 Call Trace: hidraw_report_event+0x5d/0x3a0 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:577 hid_report_raw_event+0x311/0x1730 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2076 __hid_input_report drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2152 [inline] hid_input_report+0x44e/0x580 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2174 hid_irq_in+0x47e/0x6d0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:286 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x3b3/0x5e0 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657 dummy_timer+0x8a9/0x47d0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005 Allocated by task 10: hidraw_connect+0x57/0x430 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:606 hid_connect+0x5bf/0x19d0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2277 hid_hw_start+0xa8/0x120 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2387 corsairpsu_probe+0xd9/0x3c0 drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c:782 Freed by task 10: hidraw_disconnect+0x4f/0x60 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:662 hid_disconnect drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2362 [inline] hid_hw_stop+0x101/0x1e0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2407 corsairpsu_probe+0x327/0x3c0 drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c:826 Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling hid_hw_stop(). [groeck: Updated subject and description; call hid_device_io_stop() only if IO has been started]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wan: wanxl: Only reset hardware after BAR mapping wanxl_pci_init_one() stores the freshly allocated card in driver data before the PLX BAR is mapped. Several early probe failures then unwind through wanxl_pci_remove_one(), including failure to allocate the coherent status area or to restore the DMA mask. wanxl_pci_remove_one() unconditionally calls wanxl_reset(), and wanxl_reset() dereferences card->plx. On those early failures card->plx is still NULL, so the error path can dereference a NULL MMIO pointer. Only issue the hardware reset once the BAR mapping exists. The remaining cleanup in wanxl_pci_remove_one() already checks whether later resources were allocated. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix bo->pin leaking in amdgpu_bo_create_reserved amdgpu_bo_create_reserved() only allocates a new BO when *bo_ptr (struct amdgpu_bo **bo_ptr as input parameter) is NULL, it simply skips creation when *bo_ptr is non-NULL. But it unconditionally reserves, pins, gart allocates and maps the BO afterwards. When the same non-NULL BO pointer is passed in again, for example firmware buffers that live in adev and are re-loaded on every resume / cp_resume / start under AMDGPU_FW_LOAD_DIRECT, amdgpu_bo_pin() just increases pin_count unconditionally, however the matching teardown only unpins once, so pin_count never drops to zero, so TTM is not able to move, swap or evict a BO, causing BO leaks. This commit fixes this issue by only pinning the bo once at creation, and repeated calls no longer take additional pin references. (cherry picked from commit 3ddc0ae76202c447b6aec61e907b852bc94671cf)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Check bounds in allocate_event_notification_slot The valid event ids go from 0 to KFD_SIGNAL_EVENT_LIMIT allocate_event_notification_slot has an option to specify an event id to allocate at, used by CRIU. We weren't checking the bounds on that value. Check them. v2: Lower bounds check is unecessary because of idr_alloc already rejecting negative numbers. Upper bounds check should be KFD_SIGNAL_EVENT_LIMIT since the signal mode mappings might not yet exist (cherry picked from commit 6853f1f6cbbeb3f53ebbbd7286536aeb2c5d5f50)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free. For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only: if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... } A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c; dev->rxpos++; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) { dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER; } With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded. Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path. Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur. KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change): UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_open v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr). Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: prevent fifo_req reuse during giveback dummy_hcd embeds a single shared usb_request (dum->fifo_req) that the "emulated single-request FIFO" fast-path in dummy_queue() reuses for small IN transfers: it copies the caller's request into it (req->req = *_req) and queues it, treating list_empty(&fifo_req.queue) as "the slot is free". The completion side (dummy_timer/transfer/nuke/dummy_dequeue) follows the standard pattern: list_del_init(&req->queue) unlinks the request, then the lock is dropped and usb_gadget_giveback_request() invokes req->complete(). But list_del_init() makes fifo_req.queue look empty *before* the completion callback returns, so a concurrent dummy_queue() on another CPU sees the slot as free, reuses fifo_req and runs req->req = *_req -- overwriting req->complete while dummy_timer is mid-calling it. The indirect call then jumps to a clobbered pointer, causing a general protection fault / page fault in dummy_timer (syzkaller extid faf3a6cf579fc65591ca). The clobbering write is an in-bounds memcpy on a live shared object, so KASAN cannot flag it. Add a fifo_req_busy bit covering the shared request's whole lifetime: set it in dummy_queue() when the FIFO fast-path takes fifo_req (making it the fast-path guard, replacing the list_empty(&fifo_req.queue) test), and clear it after the completion callback has returned, via a dummy_giveback() helper used at all four gadget-request giveback sites. The shared slot can no longer be reused until its completion callback has finished.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: occ: validate poll response sensor blocks The OCC poll response parser walks a counted list of sensor data blocks. It used the static backing-array capacity as the parse boundary, but a transport response makes only data_length bytes current and valid. A truncated response can therefore make the parser consume a block header or block extent outside the current response. Use data_length as the parent boundary, prove the fixed poll header and each current block header before reading them, and prove the complete block before advancing. Keep parsed sensor metadata local until the complete response has passed validation, then publish it. Propagate malformed-response errors before publishing the OCC as active.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mctp i3c: clean up notifier and buses if driver register fails mctp_i3c_mod_init() registers the I3C bus notifier and then walks the existing buses with i3c_for_each_bus_locked(mctp_i3c_bus_add_new, NULL) before registering the I3C device driver. If i3c_driver_register() fails, the function returns the error directly, leaving the notifier registered and every mctp_i3c_bus object created for the existing buses allocated. The notifier is left pointing into the module that failed to load and the bus list is leaked. Mirror the module exit path on this failure: unregister the notifier and tear down the buses that were added before returning the error. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths nsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial copy_from_user() fails before nsm->lock has been taken. The error path then blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock copy_from_user(&raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing NSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the shared out label before mutex_lock(&nsm->lock). Lockdep reported: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! exploit/193 is trying to release lock (&global_nsm.lock) at: nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv] but there are no more locks to release! no locks held by exploit/193. Return immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the common unlock label for the post-lock paths only.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free. Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients. debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: amlogic-c3: Add validations for ae and awb config Avoid invalid memory access if the zones_num is bigger than zone_weight. This patch fixes the following smatch errors: drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:111 c3_isp_params_awb_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 768 <= u32max drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:111 c3_isp_params_awb_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 768 <= u32max drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:227 c3_isp_params_ae_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 255 <= u32max drivers/media/platform/amlogic/c3/isp/c3-isp-params.c:227 c3_isp_params_ae_wt() error: buffer overflow 'cfg->zone_weight' 255 <= u32max

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: mdb: Fix source list corruption on a failed replace When replacing the source list of an MDB remote entry, all existing sources are first marked for deletion and vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add() is then called to add the new source list. Sources present in the new list have their deletion mark cleared, and any sources left marked afterwards are removed. If vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add() fails partway through, its error path deletes all entries on the remote's source list. That rollback is only correct for its other caller, vxlan_mdb_remote_add(), where the remote was just allocated and the list contains solely entries added during the call. On the replace path the list also holds pre-existing sources, so a failed replace tears them down together with their (S, G) forwarding entries instead of leaving the entry unchanged. This is reachable from an existing (*, G) remote. An EXCLUDE filter that loses sources starts forwarding traffic that should be blocked, while an INCLUDE filter that loses sources drops traffic that should be forwarded. Mark entries created during the current pass with a new VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW flag. On failure, delete only those entries and clear the deletion mark on the pre-existing ones, so a failed replace leaves the source list untouched. Retain the flag until the whole operation succeeds and then clear it. Also stop vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add() from deleting a pre-existing entry it only looked up when adding that entry's forwarding entry fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtase: Workaround for TX hang caused by hardware packet parsing The hardware performs packet parsing before packet transmission. Parsing incomplete IPv4, IPv6, TCP, or UDP headers may trigger a TX hang because the hardware parser expects additional protocol header data that is not present in the packet. The hardware performs additional PTP parsing on UDP packets identified by destination ports 319/320 at the expected UDP destination port offset. If such a packet has transport data smaller than RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN, the hardware parser expects additional packet data and may trigger a TX hang. To avoid these hardware issues, the driver applies the following workarounds. Drop malformed packets that may trigger this hardware issue before transmission. For IPv4 non-initial fragments, the hardware does not check the fragment offset before parsing the expected transport header location. As a result, these packets are still subject to transport header parsing even though they do not contain a transport header. If the transport data is shorter than the minimum transport header required by the hardware parser, pad the transport data to the minimum transport header length required by the hardware parser. Packets that also match the hardware PTP parsing conditions continue to follow the corresponding workaround. For IPv6 fragmented packets, neither of the above hardware issues occurs because the hardware only continues packet parsing when the IPv6 Base Header Next Header field directly indicates UDP. Packets carrying a Fragment Header do not continue through the subsequent packet parsing stages. For packets identified for hardware PTP parsing, pad the transport data so it reaches RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN before transmission.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: meson: vdec: Fix memory leak in error path of vdec_open The vdec_open() function previously jumped directly to err_m2m_release when vdec_init_ctrls() failed, skipping release of the m2m context. This caused a resource leak. Fix it by introducing a proper err_m2m_ctx_release label that calls v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(sess->m2m_ctx) before releasing the m2m device. This was identified via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff0000205d6878 (size 8): comm "v4l_id", pid 5289, jiffies 4294938580 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 40 d2 49 18 00 00 ff ff @.I..... backtrace (crc d3204599): kmemleak_alloc+0xc8/0xf0 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x60c/0x850 v4l2_ctrl_handler_init_class+0x1b4/0x2e8 [videodev] vdec_open+0x1f4/0x788 [meson_vdec] v4l2_open+0x144/0x460 [videodev] chrdev_open+0x1ac/0x500 do_dentry_open+0x3f0/0xfe8 vfs_open+0x68/0x320 do_open+0x2d8/0x9a8 path_openat+0x1d0/0x4f0 do_filp_open+0x190/0x380 do_sys_openat2+0xf8/0x1b0 __arm64_sys_openat+0x13c/0x1e8 invoke_syscall+0xdc/0x268 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x178/0x258 do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x70

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nuvoton: npcm-video: fix memory leaks in probe and remove npcm_video_probe() allocates the npcm_video structure with kzalloc_obj() but never frees it on any probe error path or in npcm_video_remove(), leaking the allocation on every failed probe and every normal unbind. Additionally, when npcm_video_setup_video() fails, the reserved memory association established by of_reserved_mem_device_init() in npcm_video_init() is not released, leaking the rmem_assigned_device entry on the global list. Fix both by adding kfree(video) to all probe error paths and to npcm_video_remove(), and adding the missing of_reserved_mem_device_release() call when npcm_video_setup_video() fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Add missing v4l2_subdev_cleanup() in crossbar and pipe Both mxc_isi_crossbar_init() and mxc_isi_pipe_init() call v4l2_subdev_init_finalize() which allocates the subdev active state, but neither mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() nor mxc_isi_pipe_cleanup() calls v4l2_subdev_cleanup() to free it. This causes a memory leak on every rmmod, reported by kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff0000d06fc800 (size 192): comm "(udev-worker)", pid 254, jiffies 4294913455 backtrace (crc 36eeae58): kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x5f8/0x7d8 __v4l2_subdev_state_alloc+0x1fc/0x30c __v4l2_subdev_init_finalize+0x178/0x368 Add the missing v4l2_subdev_cleanup() calls before media_entity_cleanup() in both crossbar and pipe cleanup paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: saa7134: Fix a possible memory leak in saa7134_video_init1 In saa7134_video_init1(), the return value of the first saa7134_pgtable_alloc() is not checked. If it fails, the function continues as if successful, leaving the driver with an invalid page table. Additionally, if vb2_queue_init() for the VBI queue fails after the video queue page table has been allocated, the allocated memory is not freed before returning. The second saa7134_pgtable_alloc() also lacks a return value check. Errors occur during device probing before the device is fully registered, the normal cleanup path in saa7134_finidev() is not executed, leading to memory leaks and potential use of uninitialized DMA resources. Check the return value of both saa7134_pgtable_alloc() calls and propagate errors. On failure of any later step, free allocated page tables to avoid memory leaks. Ensure control handlers are also released on error to prevent further resource leakage. Found by code review.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mei: bus: access mei_device under device_lock on cleanup Fix couple of problems in mei_cl_bus_dev_release(): mei_cl_flush_queues() is running without lock. bus->file_list access after mei_dev_bus_put(bus) can become a use-after-free if this was the last reference to bus. Protect queues cleanup and WARN traversal by device lock there to avoid the concurrent access problems. Move WARN traversal before mei_dev_bus_put(bus). This file uses bus variable name for mei_device, adjust code of mei_cl_bus_dev_release() to use bus variable too.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: amt: re-read skb header pointers after every pull Several AMT receive and transmit paths cache a pointer into the skb head (ip_hdr(), ipv6_hdr(), eth_hdr() or the AMT message header) and then call a helper that can reallocate that head before the cached pointer is used again. pskb_may_pull(), ip_mc_may_pull(), ipv6_mc_may_pull(), iptunnel_pull_header(), ip_mc_check_igmp() and ipv6_mc_check_mld() can all free the old head and move the data, so a pointer taken before the call dangles afterwards and the later access is a use-after-free of the freed head. The affected sites are: amt_rcv() caches ip_hdr() before amt_parse_type() pulls, then reads iph->saddr. amt_dev_xmit() caches ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() before ip_mc_check_igmp()/ ipv6_mc_check_mld() and pskb_may_pull(), then reads the group address. amt_multicast_data_handler() caches eth_hdr() before pskb_may_pull(), then writes the L2 header. amt_membership_query_handler() caches the AMT header, the outer and inner eth_hdr() and ip_hdr() before iptunnel_pull_header() and several pulls, then reads and writes them. amt_igmpv3_report_handler() and amt_mldv2_report_handler() cache ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() and the current group record and read the record count from the report header inside the record loop, across the *_mc_may_pull() calls. amt_update_handler() caches ip_hdr() and the AMT membership-update header before pskb_may_pull(), iptunnel_pull_header(), ip_mc_check_igmp() and the report handler, then reads iph->daddr and amtmu->nonce / amtmu->response_mac. Fix each site by either snapshotting the scalar that is used after the pull before the first pull runs, or re-deriving the header pointer from the skb after the last pull that can move the head. Values that are stable across the pull (source and group address, the response MAC and nonce, the record count, the outer source MAC) are snapshotted; pointers that are written through or read repeatedly are re-derived.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/rtp: Add RING_FORCE_TO_NONPRIV_DENY to OA whitelists Unconditionally whitelisting OA registers is a security violation. Set RING_FORCE_TO_NONPRIV_DENY bit in OA nonpriv slots, so that OA registers don't get whitelisted by default after probe, gt reset, resume and engine reset. (cherry picked from commit 90511bdcfda97211c01f1d945d4ea616578d8fca)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold hdev->lock for hci_conn_params lookups hci_conn_params_lookup requires hdev->lock be held, otherwise the list iteration or param access is not safe. Hold hdev->lock for params lookups in hci_sync.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: fix double free and WARN_ON in add_mtd_device() error paths When device_register() or mtd_nvmem_add() fails inside add_mtd_device() for a partition, the error handling triggers mtd_release() via put_device() or device_unregister(). mtd_release() calls release_mtd_partition() which frees the mtd_info structure. However, callers such as mtd_add_partition() and add_mtd_partitions() also call free_partition() in their error paths, resulting in a double free. Additionally, release_mtd_partition() hits WARN_ON(!list_empty( &mtd->part.node)) because the partition node is still linked in the parent's partitions list when the release callback fires from the add_mtd_device() error path. Fix this by overriding dev->type and dev->release before put_device() in the error paths, so that device_release() invokes a no-op function instead of mtd_release(). For the mtd_nvmem_add() failure case, device_unregister() is replaced with device_del() to separate the device removal from the final kobject reference drop, allowing the override to take effect before put_device() is called. The callers' error paths (list_del + free_partition) remain the sole owners of mtd_info lifetime on add_mtd_device() failure, which is the expected contract. The normal partition teardown path is not affected: del_mtd_device() goes through kref_put() -> mtd_device_release() -> device_unregister() with dev->type still set to &mtd_devtype, so mtd_release() -> release_mtd_partition() continues to work correctly for the regular removal case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watchdog: pretimeout: Fix UAF in watchdog_unregister_governor() When a watchdog governor is unregistered, it updates existing watchdog devices that were using this governor by falling back to `default_gov`. If the governor being unregistered is currently set as `default_gov`, the `default_gov` is never cleared. This leads to 2 use-after-free issues: 1. New watchdog devices registered after this point will inherit the dangling `default_gov`. 2. Existing watchdog devices using the unregistered governor will have their `wdd->gov` reassigned to the dangling `default_gov`. Fix the UAF by clearing `default_gov` if it matches the governor being unregistered.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211_hwsim: clamp virtio RX length before skb_put hwsim_virtio_rx_work() passes the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the device straight to skb_put() on a fixed-size receive skb. A backend reporting a length larger than the skb tailroom drives skb_put() past the buffer end and hits skb_over_panic() -- a host-triggerable guest panic (denial of service). Clamp the length to the skb's available room before skb_put(). A conforming device never reports more than the posted buffer size, so valid frames are unaffected; a truncated over-report then fails the length/header checks in hwsim_virtio_handle_cmd() and is dropped, so truncating rather than dropping here cannot be turned into a parsing problem.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: handle overlapping allocated ranges in fallocate smb3_simple_fallocate_range() can skip holes when an allocated range returned by the server starts before the current fallocate offset. The skipped hole is not zero-filled, but fallocate still returns success. A later write to that hole may therefore fail with ENOSPC. The function queries allocated ranges so that it can preserve existing contents and write zeroes only into holes. However, the server may return a range that starts before the current fallocate offset. For example, assume the fallocate request is [100, 400) and the only allocated range returned by the server is [0, 200): Request: [100, 400) Server range: [ 0, 200) allocated Correct: [100, 200) allocated data, skip [200, 400) hole, zero-fill Current: [100, 300) skipped [300, 400) zero-filled afterwards The current code adds the full server range length, 200, to the current offset 100 and moves to 300. As a result, the hole in [200, 300) is skipped without being zero-filled. Fix this by advancing only over the part of the allocated range that overlaps the current fallocate offset. Ignore ranges that end before the current offset and reject ranges whose end offset overflows. This also prevents a malformed range length from causing an out-of-bounds zero-buffer read.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: atm: ueagle-atm: reject descriptors that confuse probe and disconnect uea_probe() distinguishes a pre-firmware device from a post-firmware one using the USB id (UEA_IS_PREFIRM()), and stores a different object as the interface data in each case: a 'struct completion' for a pre-firmware device (to be waited on in .disconnect()), or a 'struct usbatm_data' for a post-firmware one. uea_disconnect() instead tells the two apart by the number of interfaces of the active configuration (a pre-firmware device exposes a single interface, ADI930 has 2 and eagle has 3), and casts the interface data accordingly. Because the two handlers use different criteria, a crafted device that advertises a pre-firmware id together with a multi-interface descriptor (or a post-firmware id with a single interface) makes them disagree: the small 'struct completion' stored by uea_probe() is then passed to usbatm_usb_disconnect(), which casts it to 'struct usbatm_data' and takes instance->serialize, reading past the end of the allocation: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880470e2c60 by task kworker/1:2/982 ... __mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80 usbatm_usb_disconnect+0x70/0x820 uea_disconnect+0x133/0x2c0 usb_unbind_interface+0x1dd/0x9e0 ... which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 96-byte region [ffff8880470e2c00, ffff8880470e2c60) Reject such inconsistent descriptors in uea_probe() so that both handlers always make the same pre/post-firmware decision.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: auth: verify auth requirement when auth_chunk is NULL sctp_auth_chunk_verify() returns true unconditionally when chunk->auth_chunk is NULL, silently skipping authentication. This is incorrect when: 1. skb_clone() failed in the BH receive path, leaving auth_chunk NULL. In sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() asoc is NULL for new connections, so the early sctp_auth_recv_cid() check cannot catch this. 2. No AUTH chunk precedes COOKIE-ECHO, so skb_clone() is never called and auth_chunk remains NULL. Fix by checking sctp_auth_recv_cid() when auth_chunk is NULL: if authentication is required, return false to drop the chunk; otherwise continue normally.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: prevent tstamp ring allocation for non-PF VSI types The pf->txtime_txqs bitmap tracks which Tx queues have ETF (Earliest TxTime First) offload enabled. This bitmap is indexed by queue number and is set by ice_offload_txtime(), which only operates on PF VSI queues. However, ice_is_txtime_ena() does not check the VSI type before consulting the bitmap. When ETF offload is enabled on PF Tx queue 0, bit 0 is set in pf->txtime_txqs. During a subsequent PCI reset rebuild, the CTRL VSI's Tx queue 0 is reconfigured and ice_is_txtime_ena() is called for that ring. Since it only checks pf->txtime_txqs by queue index without distinguishing VSI type, it finds bit 0 set and returns true, matching the PF VSI's ETF queue, not the CTRL VSI's. This causes ice_vsi_cfg_txq() to spuriously allocate a tstamp_ring for the CTRL VSI ring. Since CTRL VSI rings have no associated netdev, ice_clean_tx_ring() takes an early return at the !netdev check before reaching ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring(), leaking the allocation. Each PCI reset leaks one 64-byte tstamp_ring. Fix this by restricting ice_is_txtime_ena() to return true only for PF VSI rings, since txtime_txqs is only meaningful for PF VSI queues.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/bridge: cdns-dsi: Replace deprecated UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() The deprecated UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() macro uses the provided callbacks for both runtime PM and system sleep. This causes the DSI clocks to be disabled twice: once during runtime suspend and again during system suspend, resulting in a WARN message from the clock framework when attempting to disable already-disabled clocks. [ 84.384540] clk:231:5 already disabled [ 84.388314] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 531 at /drivers/clk/clk.c:1181 clk_core_disable+0xa4/0xac ... [ 84.579183] Call trace: [ 84.581624] clk_core_disable+0xa4/0xac [ 84.585457] clk_disable+0x30/0x4c [ 84.588857] cdns_dsi_suspend+0x20/0x58 [cdns_dsi] [ 84.593651] pm_generic_suspend+0x2c/0x44 [ 84.597661] ti_sci_pd_suspend+0xbc/0x15c [ 84.601670] dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x14c [ 84.605588] __device_suspend+0x1a0/0x56c [ 84.609594] dpm_suspend+0x17c/0x21c [ 84.613165] dpm_suspend_start+0xa0/0xa8 [ 84.617083] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x12c/0x634 [ 84.621872] pm_suspend+0x1fc/0x368 To address this issue, replace UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() with RUNTIME_PM_OPS(). Bridge and panel drivers should only deal with runtime PM, as the DRM framework manages system-wide power transitions through the bridge enable() and disable() hooks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: alvium: fix critical pointer access in alvium_ctrl_init The current implementation of alvium_ctrl_init creates several controls in function alvium_ctrl_init and uses the returned pointer without check. That can cause write access over NULL-pointer for several controls. The reworked code checks the pointers before adding flags.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rtl2832_sdr: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. rtl2832_sdr_start_streaming() had multiple error paths that hit this trap: two direct early returns (-ENODEV, -ERESTARTSYS), plus six `goto err` paths covering subdev s_power, tuner setup, ADC setup, stream-buffer allocation, urb allocation, and urb submission failures. None of them returned the queued buffers. The original function had no distinct success exit and fell straight through into the err label, which previously only did mutex_unlock and "return ret". Adding queued-buffer cleanup at err must therefore be paired with an explicit success return; otherwise every successful start would also drain the buffer queue and kill streaming. Add that success return, then add rtl2832_sdr_cleanup_queued_bufs() at the err label and before each early return. The cleanup helper takes a vb2_buffer_state argument so that the start_streaming error paths can pass VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED (as expected by userspace on start_streaming failure) while stop_streaming keeps its existing VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR semantics. This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure"). The err label still does not roll back power_ctrl(), frontend_ctrl(), the POWER_ON flag, or stream/URB allocations that may have happened before the failing step. Those are pre-existing leaks of a different class and are not addressed here.