CVE Feed

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipc/shm: serialize orphan cleanup with shm_nattch updates shm_destroy_orphaned() walks the shm idr under shm_ids(ns).rwsem, but that does not serialize all fields tested by shm_may_destroy(). In particular, shm_nattch is updated while holding shm_perm.lock, and attach paths can do that without holding the rwsem. Do not decide that an orphaned segment is unused before taking the object lock. Move the shm_may_destroy() check under shm_perm.lock, matching the other destroy paths, and unlock the segment when it no longer qualifies for removal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/poll: fix signed comparison in io_poll_get_ownership() io_poll_get_ownership() uses a signed comparison to check whether poll_refs has reached the threshold for the slowpath: if (unlikely(atomic_read(&req->poll_refs) >= IO_POLL_REF_BIAS)) atomic_read() returns int (signed). When IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG (BIT(31)) is set in poll_refs, the value becomes negative in signed arithmetic, so the >= 128 comparison always evaluates to false and the slowpath is never taken. Fix this by casting the atomic_read() result to unsigned int before the comparison, so that the cancel flag is treated as a large positive value and correctly triggers the slowpath.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix linked reg delta tracking when src_reg == dst_reg Consider the case of rX += rX where src_reg and dst_reg are pointers to the same bpf_reg_state in adjust_reg_min_max_vals(). The latter first modifies the dst_reg in-place, and later in the delta tracking, the subsequent is_reg_const(src_reg)/reg_const_value(src_reg) reads the post-{add,sub} value instead of the original source. This is problematic since it sets an incorrect delta, which sync_linked_regs() then propagates to linked registers, thus creating a verifier-vs-runtime mismatch. Fix it by just skipping this corner case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix ld_{abs,ind} failure path analysis in subprogs Usage of ld_{abs,ind} instructions got extended into subprogs some time ago via commit 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks."). These are only allowed in subprograms when the latter are BTF annotated and have scalar return types. The code generator in bpf_gen_ld_abs() has an abnormal exit path (r0=0 + exit) from legacy cBPF times. While the enforcement is on scalar return types, the verifier must also simulate the path of abnormal exit if the packet data load via ld_{abs,ind} failed. This is currently not the case. Fix it by having the verifier simulate both success and failure paths, and extend it in similar ways as we do for tail calls. The success path (r0=unknown, continue to next insn) is pushed onto stack for later validation and the r0=0 and return to the caller is done on the fall-through side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: purge outqueue on stale COOKIE-ECHO handling sctp_stream_update() is only invoked when the association is moved into COOKIE_WAIT during association setup/reconfiguration. In this path, the outbound stream scheduler state (stream->out_curr) is expected to be clean, since no user data should have been transmitted yet unless the state machine has already partially progressed. However, a corner case exists in sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(): when a Stale Cookie ERROR is received, the association is rolled back from COOKIE_ECHOED to COOKIE_WAIT. In this scenario, user data may already have been queued and even bundled with the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. During the rollback, sctp_stream_update() frees the old stream table and installs a new one, but it does not invalidate stream->out_curr. As a result, out_curr may still point to a freed sctp_stream_out entry from the previous stream state. Later, SCTP scheduler dequeue paths (FCFS, RR, PRIO, etc.) rely on stream->out_curr->ext, which can lead to use-after-free once the old stream state has been released via sctp_stream_free(). This results in crashes such as (reported by Yuqi): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100004d4d3208 by task mini_poc/9312 CPU: 1 UID: 1001 PID: 9312 Comm: mini_poc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-00305-gbd3a4795d574 #5 PREEMPT(full) sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140 sctp_outq_flush+0x1603/0x33e0 sctp_do_sm+0x31c9/0x5d30 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x392/0x6f0 sctp_inq_push+0x1db/0x270 sctp_rcv+0x138d/0x3c10 Fix this by fully purging the association outqueue when handling the Stale Cookie case. This ensures all pending transmit and retransmit state is dropped, and any scheduler cached pointers are invalidated, making it safe to rebuild stream state during COOKIE_WAIT restart. Updating only stream->out_curr would be insufficient, since queued and retransmittable data would still reference the old stream state and trigger later use-after-free in dequeue paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Prevent lockup in requeue-PI during signal/ timeout wakeup During wait-requeue-pi (task A) and requeue-PI (task B) the following race can happen: Task A Task B futex_wait_requeue_pi() futex_setup_timer() futex_do_wait() futex_requeue() CLASS(hb, hb1)(&key1); CLASS(hb, hb2)(&key2); *timeout* futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() requeue_state = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE *blocks on hb->lock* futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() futex_requeue_pi_prepare() Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE => -EAGAIN double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2) *retry* Task B acquires both hb locks and attempts to acquire the PI-lock of the top most waiter (task B). Task A is leaving early due to a signal/ timeout and started removing itself from the queue. It updates its requeue_state but can not remove it from the list because this requires the hb lock which is owned by task B. Usually task A is able to swoop the lock after task B unlocked it. However if task B is of higher priority then task A may not be able to wake up in time and acquire the lock before task B gets it again. Especially on a UP system where A is never scheduled. As a result task A blocks on the lock and task B busy loops, trying to make progress but live locks the system instead. Tragic. This can be fixed by removing the top most waiter from the list in this case. This allows task B to grab the next top waiter (if any) in the next iteration and make progress. Remove the top most waiter if futex_requeue_pi_prepare() fails. Let the waiter conditionally remove itself from the list in handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: bound enumeration string aggregation populate_enum_data() aggregates firmware-provided value-modifier and possible-value strings into fixed 512-byte struct members. The current code bounds each individual source string but then appends every string and separator with raw strcat() and no remaining-space check. Switch the aggregation loops to a bounded append helper and reject enumeration packages whose combined strings do not fit in the destination buffers. [ij: add include]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix macvlan_get_size() not reserving space for IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF macvlan_get_size() does not account for IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF, but macvlan_fill_info() conditionally includes it when port->bc_cutoff != 1. This causes nla_put_s32() to fail with -EMSGSIZE when the netlink skb runs out of space, triggering a WARN_ON in rtnetlink and preventing the interface from being dumped. The bug can be reproduced with: ip link add macvlan0 link eth0 type macvlan mode bridge ip link set macvlan0 type macvlan bc_cutoff 0 ip -d link show macvlan0 # fails with -EMSGSIZE The bc_cutoff feature was added in commit 954d1fa1ac93 ("macvlan: Add netlink attribute for broadcast cutoff"), which added the nla_put_s32() call in macvlan_fill_info() but missed adding the corresponding nla_total_size(4) in macvlan_get_size(). A follow-up commit 55cef78c244d ("macvlan: add forgotten nla_policy for IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF") fixed the missing nla_policy entry but still did not fix the size calculation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: psp: require admin permission for dev-set and key-rotate The dev-set and key-rotate netlink operations modify shared device state (PSP version configuration and cryptographic key material, respectively) but do not require CAP_NET_ADMIN. The only access control is psp_dev_check_access() which merely verifies netns membership.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix iter deadlock bpf_iter_unix_seq_show() may deadlock when lock_sock_fast() takes the fast path and the iter prog attempts to update a sockmap. Which ends up spinning at sock_map_update_elem()'s bh_lock_sock(): WARNING: possible recursive locking detected test_progs/1393 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: sock_map_update_elem+0xdb/0x1f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: __lock_sock_fast+0x37/0xe0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(slock-AF_UNIX); lock(slock-AF_UNIX); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by test_progs/1393: #0: ffff88814b59c790 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x59/0x10d0 #1: ffff88811ec25fd8 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 #2: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: __lock_sock_fast+0x37/0xe0 #3: ffffffff85a6a7c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_iter_run_prog+0x51d/0xb00 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xce __lock_acquire+0x130f/0x2590 lock_acquire+0x14e/0x2b0 _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x40 sock_map_update_elem+0xdb/0x1f0 bpf_prog_2d0075e5d9b721cd_dump_unix+0x55/0x4f4 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x5b9/0xb00 bpf_iter_unix_seq_show+0x1f7/0x2e0 bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 vfs_read+0x171/0xb20 ksys_read+0xff/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drbd: Balance RCU calls in drbd_adm_dump_devices() Make drbd_adm_dump_devices() call rcu_read_lock() before rcu_read_unlock() is called. This has been detected by the Clang thread-safety analyzer.

A flaw was found in KubeVirt's safepath package used by virt-handler. The OpenAtNoFollow function uses O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW to obtain a file descriptor to a path leaf, but downstream operations resolve the path via /proc/self/fd/N using link-following syscalls. When the leaf is a symlink, the kernel dereferences it, defeating the intended no-follow protection. An attacker with access to a virt-launcher pod can exploit this to redirect virt-handler's IPC socket connections, including the notify socket used for VM domain lifecycle events. By hijacking this socket, the attacker can inject arbitrary domain events into virt-handler, causing it to take incorrect lifecycle actions, corrupt VM state in the Kubernetes API, or crash — resulting in sustained denial of VM management services for all virtual machines on the affected node. Additionally, the same symlink following flaw allows virt-handler to apply file ownership or permission changes to unintended host paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix potential deadlock in mt7921_roc_abort_sync roc_abort_sync() can deadlock with roc_work(). roc_work() holds dev->mt76.mutex, while cancel_work_sync() waits for roc_work() to finish. If the caller already owns the same mutex, both sides block and no progress is possible. This deadlock can occur during station removal when mt76_sta_state() -> mt76_sta_remove() -> mt7921_mac_sta_remove() -> mt7921_roc_abort_sync() invokes cancel_work_sync() while roc_work() is still running and holding dev->mt76.mutex. This avoids the mutex deadlock and preserves exactly-once work ownership.

Libreswan, via the function RSA_authenticate_hash_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(), did not correctly verify the DER encoding of the ASN.1 digest when the IKEv2 AUTH payload was encoded using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017). A remote attacker can use a variation on the Bleichenbacher attack to forge the AUTH payload when small public exponents are used (e.g., e=3), leading to impersonation. Additionally, a remote attacker, by encoding a shorter than expected hash in the AUTH payload, could trigger an assertion leading to denial-of-service. The daemon aborts and restarts; continued exploitation causes sustained denial of service. Remote code execution is not possible. X.509 certificate verifications of the remote IKE peer are not affected.

Libreswan, via the function RSA_authenticate_hash_signature_raw_rsa(), did not correctly verify the length of the authentication hash when the SIG payload of an IKEv1 packet was encoded using PKCS #1 RSA Encryption as per RFC 2313. A remote attacker can use a variation on the Bleichenbacher attack to forge the SIG payload when small public exponents are being used (e.g., e=3), which could lead to impersonation. Additionally, a remote attacker, by encoding a shorter than expected hash in the SIG payload, could trigger an assertion leading to denial-of-service. The daemon aborts and restarts; continued exploitation causes sustained denial of service. Remote code execution is not possible. X.509 certificate verifications of remote IKE peers are not affected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/omfs: reject s_sys_blocksize smaller than OMFS_DIR_START omfs_fill_super() rejects oversized s_sys_blocksize values (> PAGE_SIZE), but it does not reject values smaller than OMFS_DIR_START (0x1b8 = 440). Later, omfs_make_empty() uses sbi->s_sys_blocksize - OMFS_DIR_START as the length argument to memset(). Since s_sys_blocksize is u32, a crafted filesystem image with s_sys_blocksize < OMFS_DIR_START causes an unsigned underflow there, wrapping to a value near 2^32. That drives a ~4 GiB memset() from bh->b_data + OMFS_DIR_START and overwrites kernel memory far beyond the backing block buffer. Add the corresponding lower-bound check alongside the existing upper-bound check in omfs_fill_super(), so that malformed images are rejected during superblock validation before any filesystem data is processed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Fix clone_alias() to use the original device's devid Currently clone_alias() assumes first argument (pdev) is always the original device pointer. This function is called by pci_for_each_dma_alias() which based on topology decides to send original or alias device details in first argument. This meant that the source devid used to look up and copy the DTE may be incorrect, leading to wrong or stale DTE entries being propagated to alias device. Fix this by passing the original pdev as the opaque data argument to both the direct clone_alias() call and pci_for_each_dma_alias(). Inside clone_alias(), retrieve the original device from data and compute devid from it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/komeda: fix integer overflow in AFBC framebuffer size check The AFBC framebuffer size validation calculates the minimum required buffer size by adding the AFBC payload size to the framebuffer offset. This addition is performed without checking for integer overflow. If the addition oveflows, the size check may incorrectly succed and allow userspace to provide an undersized drm_gem_object, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory access. Add usage of check_add_overflow() to safely compute the minimum required size and reject the framebuffer if an overflow is detected. This makes the AFBC size validation more robust against malformed. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: propagate nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() errors to its callers Currently, when nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() detects an out-of-bounds PDU length or offset, it triggers nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue) and returns early. However, because the function returns void, the callers are entirely unaware that a fatal error has occurred and that the cmd->recv_msg.msg_iter was left uninitialized. Callers such as nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() proceed to blindly overwrite the queue state with queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA Consequently, the socket receiving loop may attempt to read incoming network data into the uninitialized iterator. Fix this by shifting the error handling responsibility to the callers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put ... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref no longer points at. Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier CLONE_VM.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix OOB in pcpu_init_value An out-of-bounds read occurs when copying element from a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE map to another pcpu map with the same value_size that is not rounded up to 8 bytes. The issue happens when: 1. A CGROUP_STORAGE map is created with value_size not aligned to 8 bytes (e.g., 4 bytes) 2. A pcpu map is created with the same value_size (e.g., 4 bytes) 3. Update element in 2 with data in 1 pcpu_init_value assumes that all sources are rounded up to 8 bytes, and invokes copy_map_value_long to make a data copy, However, the assumption doesn't stand since there are some cases where the source may not be rounded up to 8 bytes, e.g., CGROUP_STORAGE, skb->data. the verifier verifies exactly the size that the source claims, not the size rounded up to 8 bytes by kernel, an OOB happens when the source has only 4 bytes while the copy size(4) is rounded up to 8.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in target netns for unattached ioctls /dev/ppp open is currently authorized against file->f_cred->user_ns, while unattached administrative ioctls operate on current->nsproxy->net_ns. As a result, a local unprivileged user can create a new user namespace with CLONE_NEWUSER, gain CAP_NET_ADMIN only in that new user namespace, and still issue PPPIOCNEWUNIT, PPPIOCATTACH, or PPPIOCATTCHAN against an inherited network namespace. Require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the user namespace that owns the target network namespace before handling unattached PPP administrative ioctls. This preserves normal pppd operation in the network namespace it is actually privileged in, while rejecting the userns-only inherited-netns case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: quota: Fix race of dquot_scan_active() with quota deactivation dquot_scan_active() can race with quota deactivation in quota_release_workfn() like: CPU0 (quota_release_workfn) CPU1 (dquot_scan_active) ============================== ============================== spin_lock(&dq_list_lock); list_replace_init( &releasing_dquots, &rls_head); /* dquot X on rls_head, dq_count == 0, DQ_ACTIVE_B still set */ spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock); synchronize_srcu(&dquot_srcu); spin_lock(&dq_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(dquot, &inuse_list, dq_inuse) { /* finds dquot X */ dquot_active(X) -> true atomic_inc(&X->dq_count); } spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock); spin_lock(&dq_list_lock); dquot = list_first_entry(&rls_head); WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&dquot->dq_count)); The problem is not only a cosmetic one as under memory pressure the caller of dquot_scan_active() can end up working on freed dquot. Fix the problem by making sure the dquot is removed from releasing list when we acquire a reference to it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix listxattr handling when the buffer is full [BUG] If an OCFS2 inode has both inline and block-based xattrs, listxattr() can return a size larger than the caller's buffer when the inline names consume that buffer exactly. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xb7/0xd0 mm/usercopy.c:102 Call Trace: __check_heap_object+0xe3/0x120 mm/slub.c:8243 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:196 [inline] __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:250 [inline] __check_object_size+0x5c5/0x780 mm/usercopy.c:215 check_object_size include/linux/ucopysize.h:22 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/ucopysize.h:59 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:219 [inline] listxattr+0xb0/0x170 fs/xattr.c:926 filename_listxattr fs/xattr.c:958 [inline] path_listxattrat+0x137/0x320 fs/xattr.c:988 __do_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:1001 [inline] __se_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:998 [inline] __x64_sys_listxattr+0x7f/0xd0 fs/xattr.c:998 ... [CAUSE] Commit 936b8834366e ("ocfs2: Refactor xattr list and remove ocfs2_xattr_handler().") replaced the old per-handler list accounting with ocfs2_xattr_list_entry(), but it kept using size == 0 to detect probe mode. That assumption stops being true once ocfs2_listxattr() finishes the inline-xattr pass. If the inline names fill the caller buffer exactly, the block-xattr pass runs with a non-NULL buffer and a remaining size of zero. ocfs2_xattr_list_entry() then skips the bounds check, keeps counting block names, and returns a positive size larger than the supplied buffer. [FIX] Detect probe mode by testing whether the destination buffer pointer is NULL instead of whether the remaining size is zero. That restores the pre-refactor behavior and matches the OCFS2 getxattr helpers. Once the remaining buffer reaches zero while more names are left, the block-xattr pass now returns -ERANGE instead of reporting a size larger than the allocated list buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, arm64: Fix off-by-one in check_imm signed range check check_imm(bits, imm) is used in the arm64 BPF JIT to verify that a branch displacement (in arm64 instruction units) fits into the signed N-bit immediate field of a B, B.cond or CBZ/CBNZ encoding before it is handed to the encoder. The macro currently tests for (imm > 0 && imm >> bits) || (imm < 0 && ~imm >> bits) which admits values in [-2^N, 2^N) — effectively a signed (N+1)-bit range. A signed N-bit field only holds [-2^(N-1), 2^(N-1)), so the check admits one extra bit of range on each side. In particular, for check_imm19(), values in [2^18, 2^19) slip past the check but do not fit into the 19-bit signed imm19 field of B.cond. aarch64_insn_encode_immediate() then masks the raw value into the 19-bit field, setting bit 18 (the sign bit) and flipping a forward branch into a backward one. Same class of issue exists for check_imm26() and the B/BL encoding. Shift by (bits - 1) instead of bits so the actual signed N-bit range is enforced.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: fix nfs4_file access extra count in nfsd4_add_rdaccess_to_wrdeleg In nfsd4_add_rdaccess_to_wrdeleg, if fp->fi_fds[O_RDONLY] is already set by another thread, __nfs4_file_get_access should not be called to increment the nfs4_file access count since that was already done by the thread that added READ access to the file. The extra fi_access count in nfs4_file can prevent the corresponding nfsd_file from being freed. When stopping nfs-server service, these extra access counts trigger a BUG in kmem_cache_destroy() that shows nfsd_file object remaining on __kmem_cache_shutdown. This problem can be reproduced by running the Git project's test suite over NFS.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmgenet: fix racing timeout handler The bcmgenet_timeout handler tries to take down all tx queues when a single queue times out. This is over zealous and causes many race conditions with queues that are still chugging along. Instead lets only restart the timed out queue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: neigh: let neigh_xmit take skb ownership neigh_xmit always releases the skb, except when no neighbour table is found. But even the first added user of neigh_xmit (mpls) relied on neigh_xmit to release the skb (or queue it for tx). sashiko reported: If neigh_xmit() is called with an uninitialized neighbor table (for example, NEIGH_ND_TABLE when IPv6 is disabled), it returns -EAFNOSUPPORT and bypasses its internal out_kfree_skb error path. Because the return value of neigh_xmit() is ignored here, does this leak the SKB? Assume full ownership and remove the last code path that doesn't xmit or free skb.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: um: Fix potential race condition in TLB sync During the TLB sync, we need to traverse and modify the page table, so we should hold the page table lock. Since full SMP support for threads within the same process is still missing, let's disable the split page table lock for simplicity.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in smb2_open during durable reconnect In smb2_open, the call to ksmbd_put_durable_fd(fp) drops the reference to the durable file descriptor early during the durable reconnect process. If an error occurs subsequently (eg, ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp fails) or a scavenger accesses the file, it leads to a use-after-free when accessing fp properties (eg fp->create_time). Move the single put to the end of the function below err_out2 so fp stays valid until smb2_open returns.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: fix strparser anchor skb leak on offload RX setup failure When tls_set_device_offload_rx() fails at tls_dev_add(), the error path calls tls_sw_free_resources_rx() to clean up the SW context that was initialized by tls_set_sw_offload(). This function calls tls_sw_release_resources_rx() (which stops the strparser via tls_strp_stop()) and tls_sw_free_ctx_rx() (which kfrees the context), but never frees the anchor skb that was allocated by alloc_skb(0) in tls_strp_init(). Note that tls_sw_free_resources_rx() is exclusively used for this "failed to start offload" code path, there's no other caller. The leak did not exist before commit 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser"), because the standard strparser doesn't try to pre-allocate an skb. The normal close path in tls_sk_proto_close() handles cleanup by calling tls_sw_strparser_done() (which calls tls_strp_done()) after dropping the socket lock, because tls_strp_done() does cancel_work_sync() and the strparser work handler takes the socket lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in crush_decode() A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP containing a crush map with at least one bucket has two fields holding the bucket algorithm. If the values in these two fields differ, an out-of-bounds access can occur. This is the case because the first algorithm field (alg) is used to allocate the correct amount of memory for a bucket of this type, while the second algorithm field inside the bucket (b->alg) is used in the subsequent processing. This patch fixes the issue by adding a check that compares alg and b->alg and aborts the processing in case they differ. Furthermore, b->alg is set to 0 in this case, because the destruction of the crush map also uses this field to determine the bucket type, which can again result in an out-of-bounds access when trying to free the memory pointed to by the fields of the bucket. To correctly free the memory allocated for the bucket in such a case, the corresponding call to kfree is moved from the algorithm-specific crush_destroy_bucket functions to the generic crush_destroy_bucket().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Fix error cleanup in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl() Two error handling issues exist in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl(): 1. When xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() fails, the error path jumps to put_exec_queue which skips xe_exec_queue_kill(). If the VM is in preempt fence mode, xe_vm_add_compute_exec_queue() has already added the queue to the VM's compute exec queue list. Skipping the kill leaves the queue on that list, leading to a dangling pointer after the queue is freed. 2. When xa_alloc() fails after xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() has succeeded, the error path does not call xe_hw_engine_group_del_exec_queue() to remove the queue from the hw engine group list. The queue is then freed while still linked into the hw engine group, causing a use-after-free. Fix both by: - Changing the xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() failure path to jump to kill_exec_queue so that xe_exec_queue_kill() properly removes the queue from the VM's compute list. - Adding a del_hw_engine_group label before kill_exec_queue for the xa_alloc() failure path, which removes the queue from the hw engine group before proceeding with the rest of the cleanup. (cherry picked from commit 37c831f401746a45d510b312b0ed7a77b1e06ec8)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_hbh: reject oversized option lists struct ip6t_opts stores at most IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR option descriptors, but hbh_mt6_check() does not reject larger optsnr values supplied from userspace. Validate optsnr in the rule setup path so only match data that fits the fixed-size opts array can be installed. This follows the existing xtables pattern of rejecting invalid user-provided counts in checkentry() and keeps the packet matching path unchanged. `struct ip6t_opts` has a fixed `opts[IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR]` array, where `IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR` is 16, then off-by-one array access is possible: [ 137.924693][ T8692] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_hbh.c:110:29 [ 137.926167][ T8692] index 16 is out of range for type '__u16 [16]'

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: dat: handle forward allocation error batadv_dat_forward_data() calls pskb_copy_for_clone() to duplicate an skb for each DHT candidate, but does not check the return value before passing it to batadv_send_skb_prepare_unicast_4addr(). That function dereferences the skb unconditionally, so a failed allocation triggers a NULL pointer dereference. Skip forwarding to the current DHT candidate on allocation failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bpf_sk_storage_clone and diag paths bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() sets SDATA(selem)->smap to NULL before removing the selem from the storage hlist. A concurrent RCU reader in bpf_sk_storage_clone() can observe the selem still on the list with smap already NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000050-0x0000000000000057] RIP: 0010:bpf_sk_storage_clone+0x1cd/0xaa0 net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c:174 Call Trace: <IRQ> sk_clone+0xfed/0x1980 net/core/sock.c:2591 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x30/0x760 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1222 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x35/0x2680 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:571 tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x123/0xf90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1729 tcp_check_req+0x8e1/0x2580 include/net/tcp.h:855 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1845/0x3b80 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2347 Add a NULL check for smap in bpf_sk_storage_clone(). bpf_sk_storage_diag_put_all() has the same issue. Add a NULL check and pass the validated smap directly to diag_get(), which is refactored to take smap as a parameter instead of reading it internally. bpf_sk_storage_diag_put() uses diag->maps[i] which is always valid under its refcount, so diag->maps[i] is passed directly to diag_get().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm cache: fix write hang in passthrough mode The invalidate_remove() function has incomplete logic for handling write hit bios after cache invalidation. It sets up the remapping for the overwrite_bio but then drops it immediately without submission, causing write operations to hang. Fix by adding a new invalidate_committed() continuation that submits the remapped writes to the cache origin after metadata commit completes, while using the overwrite_endio hook to ensure proper completion sequencing. This maintains existing coherency. Also improve error handling in invalidate_complete() to preserve the original error status instead of using bio_io_error() unconditionally.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: fix mm lifecycle in open-coded task_vma iterator The open-coded task_vma iterator reads task->mm locklessly and acquires mmap_read_trylock() but never calls mmget(). If the task exits concurrently, the mm_struct can be freed as it is not SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, resulting in a use-after-free. Safely read task->mm with a trylock on alloc_lock and acquire an mm reference. Drop the reference via bpf_iter_mmput_async() in _destroy() and error paths. bpf_iter_mmput_async() is a local wrapper around mmput_async() with a fallback to mmput() on !CONFIG_MMU. Reject irqs-disabled contexts (including NMI) up front. Operations used by _next() and _destroy() (mmap_read_unlock, bpf_iter_mmput_async) take spinlocks with IRQs disabled (pool->lock, pi_lock). Running from NMI or from a tracepoint that fires with those locks held could deadlock. A trylock on alloc_lock is used instead of the blocking task_lock() (get_task_mm) to avoid a deadlock when a softirq BPF program iterates a task that already holds its alloc_lock on the same CPU.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/amd/ibs: Avoid calling perf_allow_kernel() from the IBS NMI handler Calling perf_allow_kernel() from the NMI context is unsafe and could be fatal. Capture the permission at event-initialization time by storing it in event->hw.flags, and have the NMI handler rely on that cached flag instead of making the call directly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net, bpf: fix null-ptr-deref in xdp_master_redirect() for down master syzkaller reported a kernel panic in bond_rr_gen_slave_id() reached via xdp_master_redirect(). Full decoded trace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=80e046b8da2820b6ba73 bond_rr_gen_slave_id() dereferences bond->rr_tx_counter, a per-CPU counter that bonding only allocates in bond_open() when the mode is round-robin. If the bond device was never brought up, rr_tx_counter stays NULL. The XDP redirect path can still reach that code on a bond that was never opened: bpf_master_redirect_enabled_key is a global static key, so as soon as any bond device has native XDP attached, the XDP_TX -> xdp_master_redirect() interception is enabled for every slave system-wide. The path xdp_master_redirect() -> bond_xdp_get_xmit_slave() -> bond_xdp_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get() -> bond_rr_gen_slave_id() then runs against a bond that has no rr_tx_counter and crashes. Fix this in the generic xdp_master_redirect() by refusing to call into the master's ->ndo_xdp_get_xmit_slave() when the master device is not up. IFF_UP is only set after ->ndo_open() has successfully returned, so this reliably excludes masters whose XDP state has not been fully initialized. Drop the frame with XDP_ABORTED so the exception is visible via trace_xdp_exception() rather than silently falling through. This is not specific to bonding: any current or future master that defers XDP state allocation to ->ndo_open() is protected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - prevent req used-after-free for sec During packet transmission, if the system is under heavy load, the hardware might complete processing the packet and free the request memory (req) before the transmission function finishes. If the software subsequently accesses this req, a use-after-free error will occur. The qp_ctx memory exists throughout the packet sending process, so replace the req with the qp_ctx.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to HASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there are places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed by hash_algo_name[]. On 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90 print_report+0xc4/0x580 ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300 ima_init+0x7d/0xd0 init_ima+0x28/0x100 do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0 kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740 kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ================================================================== Seems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn't yet in tpm_algorithms: tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027 That's TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from "Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Library Part 2: Structures", page 51 [1]. See also the related U-Boot algorithms update [2]. Thus solve the problem by creating a file name with "_tpm_alg_<ID>" postfix if the crypto algorithm isn't initialized. This is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release): # ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/ ascii_runtime_measurements ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256 binary_runtime_measurements binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 binary_runtime_measurements_sha1 binary_runtime_measurements_sha256 policy runtime_measurements_count violations [1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf [2]: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2024-July/558835.html

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: prevent uninitialized lcn caused by zero len syzbot reported a uninit-value in ntfs_iomap_begin [1]. Since runs was not touched yet, run_lookup_entry() immediately fails and returns false, which makes the value of "*len" 0. Simultaneously, the new value and err value are also 0, causing the logic in attr_data_get_block_locked() to jump directly to ok, ultimately resulting in *lcn being triggered before it is set [1]. In ntfs_iomap_begin(), the check for a 0 value in clen is moved forward to before updating lcn to avoid this [1]. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ntfs_iomap_begin+0x8c0/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:825 ntfs_iomap_begin+0x8c0/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:825 iomap_iter+0x9b7/0x1540 fs/iomap/iter.c:110 Local variable lcn created at: ntfs_iomap_begin+0x15d/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:786

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: avoid double drm_exec_fini() in userq validate When new_addition is true, amdgpu_userq_vm_validate() calls drm_exec_fini(&exec) before iterating over the collected HMM ranges and calling amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages(). If amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages() fails in that path, the code jumps to unlock_all and calls drm_exec_fini(&exec) a second time on the same exec object. drm_exec_fini() is not idempotent: it frees exec->objects and may also drop exec->contended and finalize the ww acquire context. Route that error path directly to the range cleanup once exec has already been finalized. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool and confirmed by code review. (cherry picked from commit 2802952e4a07306da6ebe813ff1acacc5691851a)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: terminate the cached volume label after UTF-8 conversion ntfs_fill_super() loads the on-disk volume label with utf16s_to_utf8s() and stores the result in sbi->volume.label. The converted label is later exposed through ntfs3_label_show() using %s, but utf16s_to_utf8s() only returns the number of bytes written and does not add a trailing NUL. If the converted label fills the entire fixed buffer, ntfs3_label_show() can read past the end of sbi->volume.label while looking for a terminator. Terminate the cached label explicitly after a successful conversion and clamp the exact-full case to the last byte of the buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a caller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and then copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via rds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor actually wrote. rds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only write a subset of their output struct when the underlying rds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl and the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields (max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size, cache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and cache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor call and are then memcpy_to_user()'d out to user space. struct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection are the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are not marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment hole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor, rds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of their packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable, but a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have the same bug. Reproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y: a local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB, binds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on any netdev is sufficient), sendto()'s any peer on the same subnet (fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS, RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26 bytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers: 0..7 0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02 src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2 8..39 00 ... gids (memset-zeroed) 40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (max_send_wr) 48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max) 56..59 01 00 08 00 rdma_mr_size (garbage) 60..61 00 00 tos, sl 62..63 00 00 alignment padding 64..67 18 00 00 00 cache_allocs (garbage) Fix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This covers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future visitors against the same class of bug. No functional change for visitors that fully populate their output. Changes in v2: - retarget at the net tree (subject prefix "[PATCH net v2]", net/rds: prefix in the title) - pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and Allison Henderson

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vdpa: use generic driver_override infrastructure When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match() callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF. Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking care of proper locking internally. Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock held is intentional. [1]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmgenet: fix leaking free_bds While reclaiming the tx queue we fast forward the write pointer to drop any data in flight. These dropped frames are not added back to the pool of free bds. We also need to tell the netdev that we are dropping said data.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: efi/capsule-loader: fix incorrect sizeof in phys array reallocation The krealloc() call for cap_info->phys in __efi_capsule_setup_info() uses sizeof(phys_addr_t *) instead of sizeof(phys_addr_t), which might be causing an undersized allocation. The allocation is also inconsistent with the initial array allocation in efi_capsule_open() that allocates one entry with sizeof(phys_addr_t), and the efi_capsule_write() function that stores phys_addr_t values (not pointers) via page_to_phys(). On 64-bit systems where sizeof(phys_addr_t) == sizeof(phys_addr_t *), this goes unnoticed. On 32-bit systems with PAE where phys_addr_t is 64-bit but pointers are 32-bit, this allocates half the required space, which might lead to a heap buffer overflow when storing physical addresses. This is similar to the bug fixed in commit fccfa646ef36 ("efi/capsule-loader: fix incorrect allocation size") which fixed the same issue at the initial allocation site.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: sti: use managed regmap_field allocations The regmap_field objects allocated at player init are never freed and may leak resources if the driver is removed. Switch to devm_regmap_field_alloc() to automatically limit the lifetime of the allocations the lifetime of the device.